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Government Regulation of Irrationality: 
Moral and Cognitive Hazards 
Jonathan Klick† and Gregory Mitchell†† 
Several years ago the ethicist Daniel Wikler provocatively 
asked, “If we claim that relative intellectual superiority justi-
fies restricting the liberties of the retarded, could not excep-
tionally gifted persons make the same claim concerning persons 
of normal intelligence?”1 Wikler’s question, posed originally to 
raise doubts about paternalism directed at the developmentally 
disabled, possesses a new relevance today, as legal elites in-
creasingly claim that “persons of normal intelligence” exhibit 
numerous irrational tendencies that justify restrictions on 
market and nonmarket transactions.2 These new regulatory 
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benefited from the comments of Amitai Aviram, Tyler Cowen, Matthias Hild, 
Adam Hirsch, Dave Klein, Brett McDonnell, Peter Oh, Jeff Rachlinski, Mark 
Seidenfeld, Alex Tabarrok, Phil Tetlock, and participants in a faculty work-
shop at the University of Virginia School of Law. 
 1. Daniel Wikler, Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded, 8 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 377, 377 (1979). 
 2. This new paternalism represents a fairly simple and direct application 
of the dominant message emanating from the emerging behavioral law and 
economics movement, namely that people of normal, and even superior, intel-
ligence fail to pursue their interests rationally in many important situations. 
See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: 
The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 633 (1999) 
(“These cognitive illusions—sometimes referred to as ‘biases’—are not limited 
to the uneducated or unintelligent, and they are not readily capable of being 
unlearned. Instead, they affect us all with uncanny consistency and unflappa-
ble persistence.” (footnotes omitted)); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Ap-
proach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541 (1998) (“In its 
normative orientation, conventional law and economics is often strongly an-
tipaternalistic. . . . [B]ounded rationality pushes toward a sort of anti-
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proposals range from hard forms of paternalism, in which the 
government determines what is best for citizens and accord-
ingly restricts the freedom of citizens to act otherwise, to softer 
forms of paternalism, in which the government regulates the 
form in which information and options are presented to citizens 
and restricts the role of laypersons in the market, legal, and po-
litical systems without completely controlling choices.3 
 
antipaternalism—a skepticism about antipaternalism, but not an affirmative 
defense of paternalism.”); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Eco-
nomics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1085 (2000). Courts seem to be increasingly 
open to the quasi-rationality message offered by behavioral law and economics 
scholars. See infra note 109. 
 3. For instance, Russell Korobkin uses the argument from irrationality 
to found two hard-paternalism proposals. First, Korobkin argues that cogni-
tive limitations of employees in part justify government-mandated health 
benefits. See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Pro-
tection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Fail-
ure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1999) [hereinafter Korobkin, Managed Care]. 
Second, he contends that cognitive limitations of consumers justify the inclu-
sion of government-approved mandatory terms in standard form contracts. See 
Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Un-
conscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1243–44, 1255 (2003) [hereinafter 
Korobkin, Standard Form Contracts]. Thaler and Sunstein’s “libertarian pa-
ternalism,” which emphasizes using default rules to enhance the well-being of 
irrational persons, is an example of the softer forms of paternalism being ad-
vocated. See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 
93 AM. ECON. REV. 175, 176–78 (2003); see also Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. 
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 
1167, 1202 (2003). For a discussion of why libertarian paternalism functions 
as a “hard” form of paternalism for some persons, see Gregory Mitchell, Liber-
tarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1254 (2005). 
Rachlinski provides a good review of the numerous proposals advanced on ir-
rationality grounds to restrict individual choice in the market and the law-
making process. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case 
for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1177–1206 (2003). We place hard and 
soft paternalism at opposite ends of a continuum measuring degree of choice 
censorship or choice constraint, with the intention of keeping blurry the point 
at which soft paternalism crosses over into hard paternalism. Our treatment 
of hard and soft-paternalism differs from typical treatments of the hard/soft 
paternalism distinction, such as that of Gerald Dworkin, who understands 
hard paternalism to be sometimes justified “even if the action [to be affected] 
is fully voluntary” and understands soft paternalism to be justified only when 
the “person for whom we are acting paternalistically is in some way not com-
petent.” Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts, in PATERNAL-
ISM 105, 107 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983). Many behavioral law and economics 
scholars implicitly adopt a version of the traditional soft paternalism position 
that sees irrationality as a justification for intervention, on grounds that a ra-
tional person would hypothetically consent to paternalistic measures that 
counter irrational decisions: “According to [one] view, ‘respect autonomy’ is 
still a side constraint, but one which permits interference if and only if a 
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These proposals promise a “benevolent hierarchy”4 in 
which central planners substitute their judgments for those of 
impulsive, error-prone citizens,5 government agencies aggres-
sively regulate how businesses speak to the masses to prevent 
commercial exploitation,6 judges regulate the content of stan-
dard form consumer contracts,7 and bureaucrats rather than 
jurors make decisions about punitive damages to restore coher-
ence and fairness to the civil litigation system.8 Yet this re-
newed faith in better lives through paternalistic governance 
seems to ignore possible unanticipated effects of such interven-
tion.9 Our intention here is to draw attention to one of the per-
verse effects likely to follow from enactment of many of the re-
 
choice is irrational and the chooser would consent to the interference if he 
were fully rational and well informed.” Danny Scoccia, Paternalism and Re-
spect for Autonomy, 100 ETHICS 318, 318 (1990). 
 4. Wikler, supra note 1, at 384. 
 5. See, e.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 3, at 1162 (“[W]e argue for 
self-conscious efforts, by private and public institutions, to steer people’s 
choices in directions that will improve the choosers’ own welfare.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Bi-
ases, and Institutions in the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 58 (2003) 
(arguing that advertisers’ pervasive efforts and expertise at taking advantage 
of consumers’ cognitive biases justifies greater deference to government regu-
lation of commercial speech). 
 7. See, e.g., Korobkin, Standard Form Contracts, supra note 3, at 1207 
(“By recognizing purchasers’ bounded rationality as the most important root 
cause of inefficiency in form contracts, courts can modify their use of uncon-
scionability analysis to increase both social welfare generally and buyer wel-
fare specifically.”). 
 8. See Cass R. Sunstein, What Should Be Done?, in CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET 
AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 242, 252–55 (2002) (discussing 
removal of the power to award punitive damages from the jury and moving to 
a system of civil fines administered by government administrators). 
 9. Judge Kozinski argues that one of the key lessons learned from the 
collectivist experiments in Eastern Europe is that well-intentioned govern-
mental initiatives often backfire. Alex Kozinski, The Dark Lessons of Utopia, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 592–93 (1991) (“[O]ur ability to predict the full effects 
of governmental actions—much less the synergistic effects of hundreds of 
thousands of simultaneous government interventions—is very limited. Far too 
often there are unanticipated results and costs, despite the most careful efforts 
of government officials.”). Kozinski’s view echoes Weber’s warning “that the 
final result of political activity often, nay, regularly, bears very little relation 
to the original intention: often, indeed it is quite the opposite of what was in-
tended.” Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in PRINCETON READINGS IN PO-
LITICAL THOUGHT 499, 501 (Mitchell Cohen & Nicole Fermon eds., 1996), cited 
in Frederick W. Preston & Roger I. Roots, Introduction: Law and Its Unin-
tended Consequences, 47 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1371, 1371 (2004). For exam-
ples of many laws that have arguably had serious perverse effects, see the re-
cent issue of the American Behavioral Scientist devoted to the unintended 
consequences of law, 47 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1371 (2004). 
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cent paternalistic proposals, namely, inhibition of the develop-
ment of the regulated parties’ decision-making skills. Our ideas 
have distinguished precursors. Most notably, John Stuart Mill 
argued that restraints on behavior should be limited to preven-
tion of harm to others, because broader restraints may ad-
versely affect the development of individuality.10 Alexis de Toc-
queville expressed similar sentiments in a more applied context 
when he commented on the developmental benefits that accrue 
to American women, relative to European women, due to their 
increased liberty and exposure to risks.11 
The imposition of a paternalistic policy presupposes an in-
dividual will act contrary to her best interests unless some 
 
 10. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty (1859), in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ES-
SAYS 1, 70 (John Gray ed., 1991). 
 11. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, Democracy in America (1840), in DEMOC-
RACY IN AMERICA AND TWO ESSAYS ON AMERICA 1, 684 (Gerald E. Bevan 
trans., 2003) (“Long before the young American woman has reached marriage-
able age, her emancipation from her mother’s supervision has gradually 
started . . . . [T]he great scene of society lies constantly exhibited for her to see; 
far from attempting to conceal this sight from her, she is daily shown more 
and more of it and is taught to contemplate it with a steady and calm gaze.”). 
For a modern updating of this view, see Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, An Am-
bivalent Alliance: Hostile and Benevolent Sexism as Complementary Justifica-
tions for Gender Inequality, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 109, 116 (2001) (noting that 
“some forms of sexism are, for the perpetrator, subjectively benevolent, char-
acterizing women as pure creatures who ought to be protected, supported, and 
adored and whose love is necessary to make a man complete”). Within legal 
scholarship, Winick has consistently expressed a Millian concern about pater-
nalism’s effects on individual development and health. See Bruce J. Winick, 
Coercion and Mental Health Treatment, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1145, 1160 
(1997); Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 
37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1764 (1992). Also, in an earlier paper one of the present 
authors raised the moral hazard concern that is developed more fully here. See 
Jonathan Klick, The Microfoundations of Standard Form Contracts: Price Dis-
crimination vs. Behavioral Bias, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 555, 569 (2005). 
With respect specifically to governance proposals generated through be-
havioral economics, to date scholars have primarily warned about the perverse 
effect that may arise from eliminating one cognitive bias that serves to temper 
another cognitive bias, that is, the possible upsetting of offsetting biases if 
government attempts to counter biases one by one without considering the in-
teractive effects of biases. See, e.g., Jonathan Baron, Cognitive Biases, Cogni-
tive Limits, and Risk Communication, 23 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 7, 11 
(2004) (“[B]iases may work together to restore a kind of artificial equilibrium 
that works for normal situations, so that correcting one bias without correct-
ing another one can make things worse.”); see also Gregory Besharov, Second-
Best Considerations in Correcting Cognitive Biases, 71 SO. ECON. J. 12, 19 
(2004). We agree that this potential perverse effect is a serious concern, but it 
is not the only unintended consequence that may arise from government regu-
lation of irrationality. 
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third party intervenes to protect those interests.12 Such inter-
vention may be justified on grounds that the paternalism ad-
vances efficiency, personal integrity, or sound judgment.13 For 
simplicity’s sake we focus here on the goal of the new paternal-
ism to correct inefficiencies associated with systematic psycho-
logical biases in the formation of beliefs and expression of pref-
erences,14 but our analysis also has implications for the 
personal-integrity and sound-judgment rationales for paternal-
ism.15 
We question the generality of the claim that short-run inef-
 
 12. See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107, 
108 (Richard A. Wasserstrom ed., 1971) (characterizing paternalism as “the 
interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons referring ex-
clusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the per-
son being coerced”); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Con-
tracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 763 (1983) (“In general, any legal rule that prohibits 
an action on the ground that it would be contrary to the actor’s own welfare is 
paternalistic.”). We recognize the difficulties associated with defining pater-
nalism, see, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability 
Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 211 (2000) (“[T]he 
literature on paternalism contains a variety of explicit and implicit concep-
tions of paternalism.”), and we recognize that some may claim that govern-
ment regulation of irrationality is not paternalistic. Nevertheless, we are in-
terested in whether government regulation of irrationality reliably achieves 
the goal of efficiency, whether that goal can rightly be labeled paternalistic or 
not. 
 13. See Kronman, supra note 12, at 765 (noting that some paternalistic 
regulations “are best explained by considerations of economic efficiency and 
distributive fairness, others by the idea of personal integrity, and a third set of 
limitations by the . . . notion of sound judgment”). 
 14. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First 
Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 645 (2004) (”[U]nder some circum-
stances paternalism can be efficient, especially where people’s preferences are 
irrational. Still others, pointing to the limits of individual human reason and 
the frequency of market failure, see broad areas where it is legitimate” (foot-
notes omitted)). 
 15. For instance, the notion behind the personal-integrity justification is 
that paternalistic intervention constitutes no invasion of personal integrity 
when it disrupts lowly ranked concerns to protect highly ranked concerns. See 
JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 68 (1984). But if paternalism interferes with the 
life-long developmental processes needed to distinguish lowly ranked from 
highly ranked values and then to pursue higher values, then the personal-
integrity justification loses some of its force. The difficulty, of course, is distin-
guishing between those freedoms that are vital to developing personal integ-
rity and those that will impede development. Perhaps the best case can be 
made for restricting minors’ access to addictive goods that pose serious health 
risks. Lowenstein, for instance, argues that smoking has developmental costs 
that surely outweigh the benefits of protecting cigarette advertisements aimed 
at children. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, “Too Much Puff”: Persuasion, Paternal-
ism, and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1212–13 (1988). 
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ficiencies associated with psychological biases justify paternal-
istic government regulations.16 In particular, we argue that 
there will often be long-run costs of paternalistic regulations 
that offset short-run gains because of the negative learning and 
motivational effects of paternalistic regulations. An apprecia-
tion of the role of learning and motivation in the development 
of rational behavior, and the necessary concomitant that indi-
viduals differ in their propensities to act rationally, suggests 
two broad limitations on the force and scope of irrationality-
based arguments for paternalism. First, individual and situ-
 
 16. For instance, Korobkin expressly argues that psychological biases lead 
to inefficiencies that can be corrected with paternalistic interventions. See 
Korobkin, Managed Care, supra note 3, at 88; Korobkin, Standard Form Con-
tracts, supra note 3, at 1294 (“The design of non-salient terms is better as-
signed to government institutions because the market will not create pressure 
toward efficiency and state actors, as imperfect as they will be, at least can 
aim at the proper target.”). 
Within legal scholarship, Zamir argues most generally that paternalistic 
legal rules will be economically efficient if the citizenry is assumed to be 
boundedly rational. See Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 229, 252 (1998) (“Once the prevalence of systematic deviations from the 
rational-maximizer model is acknowledged, principled antipaternalism is no 
longer a tenable position of economic analysis.”). The primary difference be-
tween Zamir’s model and our analysis is that we effectively endogenize the 
magnitude of the cognitive bias under which an individual makes her deci-
sions. That is, while Zamir assumes that the likelihood of an individual choos-
ing correctly is given, we explicitly model the individual’s choice of how much 
cognitive effort to expend and that effort in turn determines the individual’s 
likelihood of choosing correctly. In terms of evaluating the ultimate welfare 
implications of a particular paternalistic intervention, our model implies that 
the relevant comparison does not just involve comparing which decision maker 
(individual or paternalist) is more likely to choose correctly as in Zamir’s 
model; it also involves comparing the cost of improving an individual’s likeli-
hood of choosing correctly with the cost of administering the paternalistic in-
tervention. In addition, whereas Zamir recognizes but discounts the possible 
long-term effects of paternalism, largely on grounds that cognitive biases are 
ubiquitous and persistent, see id. at 276–77, we believe that growing evidence 
of the situation- and person-dependent nature of rationality errors and the re-
alization that the heuristic and bias research is not as robust as previously 
thought, counsel greater concern for the developmental and incentive effects of 
paternalism. See, e.g., Mandeep K. Dhami et al., The Role of Representative 
Design in an Ecological Approach to Cognition, 130 PSYCHOL. BULL. 959, 976 
(2004) (“[R]esearch in the heuristics-and-biases program involves carefully 
setting up conditions that produce cognitive biases. The extent to which these 
findings generalize to conditions outside the laboratory is unclear.” (citations 
omitted)); David R. Shanks et al., A Re-examination of Probability Matching 
and Rational Choice, 15 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 233, 248 (2002) (noting 
that probability matching “is heavily context-dependent and . . . can be made 
to disappear under appropriate conditions of task structure, training, motiva-
tion, and feedback”). 
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ational variation in irrational tendencies will often make debi-
asing interventions, or no intervention at all, more efficient 
than paternalistic interventions. Second, paternalistic inter-
ventions may exacerbate irrational tendencies by creating 
moral and cognitive hazards. Moral hazards arise because pa-
ternalistic regulations reduce an individual’s motivation to act 
deliberately and carefully, and motivation level mediates many 
psychological biases. What we term “cognitive hazards” arise 
when paternalistic regulations interfere with information 
searches, educational investments, and feedback that would oc-
cur in the absence of paternalistic interventions and that are 
important to the individual’s development of effective decision-
making skills and strategies.17 
Our cautionary argument regarding paternalistic interven-
tions follows from psychological research on judgment and deci-
sion making and economic modeling of decision-making behav-
ior under a paternalistic regime. In Part I, we provide a 
theoretical and empirical justification for the moral and cogni-
tive hazards of paternalism utilizing two bodies of psychological 
research that have been largely ignored by behavioral law and 
economics scholars. First, research from developmental psy-
chology indicates that individuals improve their decision-
making skills over time through a “learning by doing” process, 
and that paternalistic policies threaten interference in this self-
regulatory process.18 Second, research on self-fulfilling prophe-
 
 17. Within judgment and decision-making studies it is often difficult to 
separate motivational from cognitive determinants of behavior, see, e.g., Nor-
bert Schwarz, Social Judgment and Attitudes: Warmer, More Social, and Less 
Conscious, 30 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149, 159–60 (2000), but generally moti-
vated processing is conceived of as goal-directed thought aimed at protecting 
one’s self-image or existing beliefs or achieving accuracy, whereas cognitive 
processing simply refers to the operation of information-processing mecha-
nisms without any particular directional or self-serving goal presumed. See, 
e.g., Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 
495 (1990) (“Although the mechanisms underlying motivated reasoning are 
not yet fully understood, it is now clear that directional goals do affect reason-
ing.”). For our purposes, we need only distinguish between hazards associated 
with changes in motives to engage in effortful, analytic thought in the present 
which is more likely to lead to rational behavior (i.e., moral hazards), and haz-
ards associated with changes in the amount of information learned (i.e., cogni-
tive hazards). Both hazards may result from paternalistic intervention and 
cause long-run inefficiencies, although through different mechanisms. For dis-
cussion of the relation between cognitive and moral hazard in economic terms, 
see infra note 79. 
 18. Cf. Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 1214 (“The role of individual learning 
and adaptation . . . cannot be ignored in assessing the need for paternalism. 
Simple experience might, in some contexts, be a much better cure for cognitive 
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cies warns that regulated parties are likely to become the weak 
decision makers envisioned by paternalistic policy makers, as 
paternalistic regulations undercut personal incentives to invest 
in cognitive capital and the regulated parties conform to the 
expectancies of the paternalist.19 
In Part II, we develop economic models of behavior under 
paternalism that further support the view that paternalism 
may lead to suboptimal long-run behavior. These models spec-
ify when paternalistic accommodation of irrational tendencies 
is warranted, when education or another debiasing approach to 
irrational tendencies is warranted, and when no governmental 
action is warranted. In Part III, using insights from our eco-
nomic models of behavior under paternalism, we discuss the 
factors that should be considered when designing paternalistic 
interventions in order to limit the cognitive and moral hazards 
of paternalism. We also note the woefully inadequate state of 
empirical knowledge relevant to these factors and hence the 
great likelihood that many paternalistic interventions are 
suboptimal. 
I.  JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING  
UNDER PATERNALISM 
A. A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON DECISION-MAKING 
COMPETENCE 
Contrary to the static approaches to judgment and decision 
making that underlie most behavioral law and economics un-
derstandings of irrationality and concomitant calls for pater-
nalism to counter irrational behaviors,20 we consider how pa-
 
missteps than adopting a paternalist intervention.”). 
 19. Cf. Jon Elster, Selfishness and Altruism, in BEYOND SELF INTEREST 
44, 47 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) (“[T]he opportunity to choose—including 
the right to make the wrong choices—is a valuable, in fact, indispensable, 
means to self-improvement.”); Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public 
Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 52 (1995) 
(“Many psychologists (and historians too) have noticed a tendency for indi-
viduals and groups to take on the characteristics that others, particularly 
those in positions of authority, ascribe to them—what is known in the psycho-
logical literature as a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy.’”). 
 20. Behavioral law and economics scholars often catalog the many psycho-
logical biases that have been demonstrated by psychologists and behavioral 
economists, typically in laboratory experiments or through classroom surveys 
using word problems, and then use this assortment of biases to justify a par-
ticular approach to legal regulation. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, 
at 633–34; Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 1476–77; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 
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ternalistic regulations may affect cognitive behavior over time 
both inside and outside the regulated domain.21 Before intro-
ducing our economic models of behavior under paternalism, we 
introduce the psychological framework and empirical findings 
that motivate these models. Of particular importance are 
Byrnes’s self-regulation model of decision making22 and evi-
dence for the role of incentives and personal motivation as me-
diators of rational action. 
 
2, at 1058. These menu or snapshot approaches to judgment and decision 
making focus on how a particular legal judgment or decision might fall prey to 
one or more biases. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 2, at 1096–97. Be-
havioral law and economics’ static approach to judgment and decision making 
is largely a function of behavioral decision theory’s lack of an integrative the-
ory. Id. at 1057. The dominant research program within behavioral decision 
theory, the heuristics and biases program, consists of a collection of robust 
empirical findings bound together by high-level concepts rather than an inte-
grative theory that can predict how particular features of the mind and envi-
ronment are likely to interact in particular cases (e.g., the heuristics and bi-
ases program predicts that accessible features of the environment and memory 
will exert inordinate influence on judgments, but it lacks a theory of accessibil-
ity). See, e.g., Michael R.P. Dougherty et al., Memory as a Fundamental Heu-
ristic for Decision Making, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND 
DECISION RESEARCH 125, 128 (Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau eds., 
2003); Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping 
Bounded Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 697, 702 (2003) (“[M]uch is known 
about the determinants of accessibility, but there is no general theoretical ac-
count of accessibility and no prospect of one emerging soon.”). For an internal 
critique of psychology’s emphasis on demonstrating judgment and decision-
making shortcomings, see Joachim I. Krueger & David C. Funder, Towards a 
Balanced Social Psychology: Causes, Consequences and Cures for the Problem-
Seeking Approach to Social Behavior and Cognition, 27 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 
313 (2004). 
 21. Brehmer notes that research limiting itself to “snapshots of judg-
mental processes” is 
an important line of research, for there are undoubtedly situations in 
which momentary accuracy is important. However, to an organism 
behaving in time, momentary accuracy may be less important. It is 
only necessary that the momentary level of achievement is sufficient 
to point the organism in the right direction, for there are always pos-
sibilities for later corrections. It does not seem unlikely that such 
“cognition over time” is the natural form of cognition. If so, the levels 
of achievement that are found in “snapshot studies” of judgment and 
decision making are neither surprising nor alarming. It certainly 
gives an answer to the puzzle of how organisms have survived despite 
their seemingly inefficient cognitive equipment. 
Berndt Brehmer, Man as a Stabiliser of Systems: From Static Snapshots of 
Judgment Processes to Dynamic Decision Making, 2 THINKING & REASONING 
225, 226 (1996) (citations omitted). 
 22.  JAMES P. BYRNES, THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF DECISION 
MAKING: A SELF-REGULATION MODEL (1998) (proposing and introducing the 
self-regulation model of decision making). 
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Byrnes’s self-regulation model assumes that “[t]he key to 
being successful in life is knowing the difference between op-
tions that are likely to produce favorable outcomes and options 
that are unlikely to produce favorable outcomes.”23 Through 
education, experimentation, experience, and observation, indi-
viduals learn which options are most likely to produce desirable 
outcomes and develop competence in the ability to compile and 
rank-order options, and then select the option that will lead to 
the most favorable outcome.24 The main vehicle to greater deci-
sion-making competence is alteration in existing psychological 
states such that later psychological states possess more reliable 
knowledge about what ends are most valued and how best to 
achieve those ends.25 Outcome feedback and verbal feedback 
serve as the main mechanisms for change between earlier and 
later psychological states.26 
 
 23. James P. Byrnes, The Development of Decision-Making, 31 J. ADOLES-
CENT HEALTH 208, 208 (2002); see also James P. Byrnes et al., Learning to 
Make Good Decisions: A Self-Regulation Perspective, 70 CHILD DEV. 1121, 
1121 (1999) (“[T]here should be a close correspondence between effective deci-
sion-making and personal success.”). Hence, Byrnes effectively employs a 
means-end or instrumental account of rationality that is consistent with weak 
microeconomic conceptions of rationality and efficiency. 
 24. Byrnes breaks the decision process down into four steps: (1) setting a 
goal, (2) compiling options to achieve the goal, (3) rank-ordering the options, 
and (4) selecting the highest-ranked option. Byrnes et al., supra note 22, at 
1121. Direct involvement in a task is not the sole route to learning; observing 
others perform the task may lead to one’s own improvement on the task or 
lead to adaptive avoidance of the task altogether (e.g., observing other day 
traders fail may wisely lead one to avoid day trading entirely). See Nigel Har-
vey & Ilan Fischer, Development of Experience-Based Judgment and Decision 
Making: The Role of Outcome Feedback, in THE ROUTINES OF DECISION MAK-
ING 119, 134–35 (Tilman Betsch & Susanne Haberstroh eds., 2005). 
 25. See Byrnes et al., supra note 23, at 1122–23. 
 26. See id. at 1122. Outcome feedback refers to success or failure of a cho-
sen option; verbal feedback refers to “commentary or advice given before or 
after choices are made.” Id. The relatively few studies that have empirically 
examined the role of feedback in adult decision making suggest that adults 
can “progressively learn to make better decisions if they receive[] relatively 
clear feedback from outcomes.” Id. at 1125 (citations omitted). Although ver-
bal, or cognitive, feedback has often been shown to lead to greater learning 
than outcome feedback, Byrnes, Miller, and Reynolds report empirical results 
showing that “outcome feedback was more effective than verbal feedback” to 
effect positive change in choice behavior. Byrnes et al., supra note 23, at 1137. 
Compare William K. Balzer et al., Effects of Cognitive Feedback on Perform-
ance, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 410, 410 (1989) (“In contrast to [outcome feedback], 
[cognitive feedback] has been found to improve the accuracy of judgments in 
many circumstances.”) with Byrnes et al., supra note 23, at 1137. For a review 
of the impact of outcome feedback on various types of judgments and decisions, 
see generally Harvey & Fischer, supra note 24. 
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The self-regulation model is not exclusively behaviorist in 
its orientation, however, as it posits an “endogenous tendency 
toward self-regulation” that keeps one oriented “toward in-
creased accuracy in the face of occasional instances of success 
and failure that could lead it astray” (i.e., a model that controls 
for random disturbances in the system).27 This self-regulation 
tendency, which is presumed to operate through the long-term 
memory system, leads to conservatism in the changes made be-
tween earlier and later psychological states that are relevant to 
decision-making success.28 Thus, individual instances of suc-
cess or failure, unless accompanied by verbal feedback, may re-
sult in few changes in psychological states due to this conserva-
tism, but repeated instances of outcome feedback within a 
particular domain or with a particular task or goal that cuts 
across domains are likely to lead to changes in psychological 
states.29 
 
 27. Byrnes et al., supra note 23, at 1122. 
 28. See id. at 1122–23 (“Conservative belief change is highly adaptive in 
an uncertain and variable environment.”). Gibson and colleagues offer a paral-
lel process model of learning in dynamic decision environments that can ex-
plain gradual learning and generalization from feedback. See Faison P. Gibson 
et al., Learning in Dynamic Decision Tasks: Computational Model and Em-
pirical Evidence, 71 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1 
(1997). One can also view the learning process as a reinforcement model, 
which also leads to gradual change. See Eric Von Magnus, Preference, Ration-
ality, and Risk Taking, 94 ETHICS 637, 639–40 (1984). 
 29. Support for this conclusion is found in laboratory studies of markets, 
where choices in experimental repetitive markets often converge toward the 
rational choice equilibrium. See Vernon L. Smith, Economics in the Labora-
tory, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 118 (1994) (noting a “tendency for rational behav-
ior to emerge in the context of a repetitive market institution” and that “[i]n 
many experimental markets, . . . human agents interact through the trading 
rules to produce social algorithms which demonstrably approximate the 
wealth maximizing outcomes traditionally thought to require complete infor-
mation and cognitively rational actors” (footnote omitted)); see also Colin 
Camerer et al., The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimen-
tal Analysis, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1232, 1242 (1989) (noting, with respect to the 
“curse of knowledge,” or the negative effects of asymmetric information, that 
“[m]arket experience clearly reduces bias more than individual judgment tem-
pered by incentives and feedback”). In addition, Gervais and Odean provide a 
dynamic model of overconfidence in trading that supports the self-regulation 
model of decision making: 
When a trader is successful, he attributes too much of his success to 
his own ability and revises his beliefs about his ability upward too 
much. In our model overconfidence is dynamic, changing with suc-
cesses and failures. Average levels of overconfidence are greatest in 
those who have been trading for a short time. With more experience, 
people develop better self-assessments. 
Simon Gervais & Terrance Odean, Learning to Be Overconfident, 14 REV. FIN. 
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It is also important to emphasize that the self-regulation 
model, because it incorporates cognitive components, allows for 
both domain-specific and domain-general learning, though the 
presumption is that domain-specific learning is more com-
mon.30 Learning may thus take the form of increases in the ac-
curacy of one’s beliefs in a particular domain or development of 
domain-general theories about the relationship of higher-order 
goals and procedures for achieving those goals.31 For instance, 
developing effective self-control techniques in order to save for 
an automobile or home may generalize to effective strategies 
for retirement saving. Or, as demonstrated by empirical re-
search on the endowment effect, people may learn to overcome 
consumer biases with greater market experience, and this 
learning may generalize across goods.32 Calibration of beliefs 
may involve improved self-knowledge, particularly with respect 
to likes and dislikes and consumption tendencies, and not sim-
 
STUD. 1, 19 (2001). Gervais and Odean also note that empirical data are con-
sistent with this dynamic model of overconfident trading. See id. (“[Y]ounger 
investors trade more actively than older investors while earning lower returns 
relative to a buy-and-hold portfolio. These results are consistent with our pre-
diction that overconfidence diminishes with greater experience.”). Bjorklund 
argues more generally that immaturity in one’s metacognition (i.e., knowledge 
about the workings of one’s own mind) has positive effects on physical and 
cognitive development, because such immaturity leads to exploratory behavior 
and learning that would not occur in a person with a more mature metacogni-
tive state and a better-calibrated confidence level with respect to her abilities. 
See David F. Bjorklund, The Role of Immaturity in Human Development, 122 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 153, 163–66 (1997). Thus, overconfidence provides adaptive 
benefits that, in the long run, outweigh any initial, short-run costs. 
 30. See Byrnes et al., supra note 23, at 1124. Thus, learning should occur 
more quickly in repetitive decision settings, such as with many consumer 
goods, but learning may also generalize across goods and decision settings. 
 31. The precise ways in which domain-specific and domain-general knowl-
edge structures change are not important to our treatment. Dougherty and his 
colleagues offer an account of how experience and domain knowledge may pro-
gressively lead to reduced error. See Dougherty et al., supra note 20, at 144–
51. Note, however, that much of the learning that takes place will be in the 
form of “tacit knowledge” rather than “academic intelligence.” “Tacit knowl-
edge refers to general and domain specific skills and abilities acquired over 
time. It is possible that an individual may absorb these skills and abilities 
through experience rather than through formal education and training.” 
James E. Hunton & Ruth Ann McEwen, An Assessment of the Relation Be-
tween Analysts’ Earning Forecast Accuracy, Motivational Incentives and Cog-
nitive Information Search Strategy, 72 ACCT. REV. 497, 514 (1997) (citations 
omitted). 
 32. See John A. List, Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evi-
dence from the Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA 615, 624 (2004). 
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ply knowledge about causal relations in the external world.33 In 
addition, learning will take the form of discovering when exter-
nal resources should be recruited to overcome internal resource 
limitations, such as knowing when to consult experts or gain 
explicit education in a domain.34 
The self-regulation model has obvious implications for 
hard-paternalism proposals that restrict choice and opportuni-
ties: feedback and learning cannot occur if “institutional and 
other structures essentially rule out the possibility of experi-
encing feedback that might be contrary to one’s beliefs.”35 To 
the extent that government is more likely to intervene pater-
nalistically on important choices, paternalistic constraints on 
learning are likely to be significant in such cases because more 
important decisions elicit more effortful evaluation processing 
than less important decisions.36 
Softer forms of paternalism may also adversely affect 
learning by altering the individual’s representation of the 
choice setting and how she encodes feedback about success or 
failure in a given situation.37 The individual does not exert the 
same level of control in compiling and assessing options in the 
presence of soft paternalism, and verbal feedback about even a 
soft paternalistic situation should cause the individual to dis-
count her own role in achieving a particular outcome.38 
 
 33. See Byrnes, supra note 23, at 210 (“[T]here is an important, but rela-
tively ignored, aspect of knowledge that might prove to produce consistent age 
differences in choices: self-knowledge.”). 
 34. See id. at 209 (“[C]ompetent decision-makers use strategies to over-
come obstacles that might hinder the discovery process. For example, they 
might seek advice from knowledgeable people when they are not sure how to 
proceed . . . .”); see also Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 1219 (“Often, even if peo-
ple employ a suboptimal strategy and cannot adapt, they can recognize their 
own limitations and hire others to help them make decisions.”). 
 35. Byrnes et al., supra note 23, at 1123 (citation omitted). 
 36. Byrnes, supra note 23, at 211 (“Studies show that adults are likely to 
alternate between effortful and less effortful evaluation strategies depending 
of [sic] the importance of a decision.” (citation omitted)). 
 37. In addition, some seemingly soft forms of paternalism may effectively 
operate as hard forms of paternalism. See Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1248 (not-
ing that “libertarian paternalism is an oxymoron”). 
 38. It is possible, however, that a self-serving attributional bias will in-
hibit the discounting effect that should occur with respect to positive feedback 
in a soft-paternalism situation. See Amy H. Mezulis et al., Is There a Univer-
sal Positivity Bias in Attributions? A Meta-Analytic Review of Individual, De-
velopmental, and Cultural Differences in the Self-Serving Attributional Bias, 
130 PSYCHOL. BULL. 711, 738 (2004) (“We found strong support for the exis-
tence of a robust self-serving bias in attributions.”). 
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From this consideration of self-regulatory processes in de-
cision making, three propositions may be extracted: (1) pater-
nalistic policies that restrict choice options restrict learning op-
portunities; (2) the noisier the learning environment, the more 
difficult to learn, and paternalistic policies introduce noise into, 
or mute feedback signals in, the learning environment;39 (3) the 
more extensive the paternalism imposed on citizens, the 
greater the cognitive hazard, due to restricted learning oppor-
tunities and more noise in learning environments. 
This dynamic approach to decision making and the effects 
of paternalism finds further support in the renewed apprecia-
tion of the role that incentives play in the rationality of judg-
ment and decision making. Contrary to some suggestions oth-
erwise within behavioral law and economics, material 
incentives do improve the quality of choice under certain condi-
tions: 
Incentives improve performance in easy tasks that are effort respon-
sive, like judgment, prediction, problem-solving, recalling items from 
memory, or clerical tasks. Incentives sometimes hurt when problems 
are too difficult or when simple intuition or habit provides an optimal 
answer and thinking harder makes things worse. In games, auctions, 
and risky choices the most typical result is that incentives do not af-
fect mean performance, but incentives often reduce variance in re-
sponses. In situations where there is no clear standard of perform-
ance, incentives often cause subjects to move away from favorable 
“self-presentation” behavior toward more realistic choices.40 
 
 39. As the feedback structure becomes more complex, individuals have a 
harder time making effective use of feedback. See Brehmer, supra note 21, at 
234–36. However, to the extent that feedback about task information, or in-
formation about the relation between environmental cues and the true state of 
the object or criterion to be judged, is available, some learning may occur even 
in more complex environments. See William K. Balzer et al., Effects of Cogni-
tive Feedback Components, Display Format, and Elaboration on Performance, 
58 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 369, 382 (1994) 
(“[I]t is the [task information] component of [cognitive feedback] (i.e., telling 
judges the correct strategy for weighting and integrating information to opti-
mize their judgments) that is essential for improving judgment performance.”). 
 40. Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incen-
tives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 34 (1999); see also Vernon L. Smith, Method in Ex-
periment: Rhetoric and Reality, 5 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 91, 101–02 (2002) 
(“Anyone who doubts that payoffs can and do matter has not looked at the evi-
dence. What is not predictable by any theory is what situations will be sensi-
tive at what payoff levels and what situations will not be sensitive at the lev-
els commonly used.”). In addition, cognitive behavior under conditions of low 
material payoffs or hypothetical payoffs may differ significantly from behavior 
in response to economic situations with significant real consequences, such 
that it becomes risky to assume bias in low-cost situations will manifest itself 
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Incentives play an important role in the quality of judg-
ment and choice even if we take the most restrictive view of the 
positive effects of incentives—namely, that incentives move be-
havior toward the rational response only in cases where a 
dominant or clear normative response exists or where irra-
tional behavior occurs due to lack of attention or interest.41 In-
centives remain important under even this restrictive view be-
cause several psychological biases arise from inattention or 
insufficient motivation to engage in information search, and 
thus the incidence and severity of these biases are conditional 
on incentive levels.42 
 
identically in high-cost situations. See Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 
Varying the Scale of Financial Incentives Under Real and Hypothetical Condi-
tions, 24 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 417, 418 (2001); see also James F. Smith & 
Thomas Kida, Heuristics and Biases: Expertise and Task Realism in Auditing, 
109 PSYCHOL. BULL. 472, 486 (1991) (“For many audit judgments, the costs 
associated with certain risks are sufficiently large that they seem to signifi-
cantly influence the nature of audit training and formalized audit proce-
dures.”). 
 41. See Dan N. Stone & David A. Ziebart, A Model of Financial Incentive 
Effects in Decision Making, 61 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 250, 259 (1995) (“[I]ncentives appear to increase the extent of at-
tention given to a task, but also to increase potentially distracting emo-
tions . . . .”). A slightly less-restrictive view is that for some biases that involve 
more than lack of interest or inattentiveness incentives will be effective only 
for those people who possess the cognitive capacity or ability to compute the 
rational solution. See, e.g., Vidya Awasthi & Jamie Pratt, The Effects of Mone-
tary Incentives on Effort and Decision Performance: The Role of Cognitive 
Characteristics, 65 ACCT. REV. 797, 808 (1990) (reporting that monetary incen-
tives improved the performance of subjects with higher perceptual differentia-
tion ability (i.e., the ability to abstract familiar concepts or relationships from 
a complex setting) with respect to application of the conjunction probability 
and sample size rules). An even less restrictive view of incentives would argue 
for the positive effects of incentives on decision avoidance, use of decision aids, 
and recruitment of expert assistance. This view remains untested within 
judgment and decision-making research because this research rarely presents 
these options to subjects, but instead examines how subjects’ own, unassisted 
performance on rational-thinking tests is affected by incentives. 
 42. Frey and Eichenberger note that positive incentive effects have been 
found with respect to numerous anomalies, including preference reversals, the 
Allais paradox, the certainty effect, ambiguity aversion, deviations between 
willingness-to-pay prices and willingness-to-accept prices, base rate neglect, 
overoptimism, anchoring, the hindsight bias, temporal inconsistencies, and 
framing effects. See Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, Economic Incen-
tives Transform Psychological Anomalies, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 215, 225 
n.16 (1994); see also Ralph Hertwig & Andreas Ortmann, Experimental Prac-
tices in Economics: A Methodological Challenge for Psychologists?, 24 BEHAV. 
& BRAIN SCI. 383, 391–96 (2001) (surveying a variety of studies in which in-
centives positively affected performance). Engelmann and Strobel, in a study 
of the false consensus effect, show how incentives can improve information 
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In addition to direct material incentives, holding people ac-
countable for their judgments and decisions can likewise move 
behavior toward the rational norm.43 “Predecisional account-
ability to an unknown audience will attenuate biases that arise 
from lack of self-critical attention to one’s decision processes 
and failure to use all relevant cues.”44 Thus, expecting to have 
to account for a choice may have positive effects on decision-
making quality.45 
A direct linkage exists between incentives and self-
regulation: incentives often motivate a decision maker to invest 
cognitive effort and other resources to achieve a goal, with the 
positive by-product of increased procedural and self-knowledge 
even in cases of outcome failure. That is, the self-regulation 
 
search and belief formation. See Dirk Engelmann & Martin Strobel, The False 
Consensus Effect Disappears if Representative Information and Monetary In-
centives Are Given, 3 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 241, 253 (2000) (“[G]iven both 
these incentives and representative information, although subjects show a 
consensus effect, they show no false consensus effect.”). Based on these results, 
Engelmann and Strobel note that “the false consensus effect might not be very 
relevant for economic applications.” Id. Incentive effects may also be under-
stood within a dual-process model of cognition: to the extent incentives en-
courage shifts from intuitive to deliberative thinking, those biases that can be 
reduced by more effortful, deliberative thought should be positively affected by 
increasing incentives. Cf. Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Who Uses 
Base Rates and P(D/~H)? An Analysis of Individual Differences, 26 MEMORY 
& COGNITION 161, 166–69, 171, 175–76 (1998) (reporting significant correla-
tions between propensity to engage in more deliberative thought and positive 
performance tests of cognitive ability, deductive reasoning ability, and induc-
tive reasoning ability). Combining market forces with incentives provides even 
more potent debiasing force. See, e.g., David M. Grether, Individual Behavior 
and Market Performance, 76 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1079, 1079–82 (1994) (dis-
cussing the role of incentives and markets in reducing the incidence and ef-
fects of the representativeness heuristic, preference reversals, and the en-
dowment effect). 
 43. The particular contours of the accountability constraint are important: 
Self-critical and effortful thinking is most likely to be activated when 
decision makers learn prior to forming any opinions that they will be 
accountable to an audience (a) whose views are unknown, (b) who is 
interested in accuracy, (c) who is interested in processes rather than 
specific outcomes, (d) who is reasonably well-informed, and (e) who 
has a legitimate reason for inquiring into the reasons behind partici-
pants’ judgments. 
Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Account-
ability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 259 (1999). 
 44. Id. at 265. 
 45. Accountability may, however, exacerbate bias “to the extent that (a) a 
given judgment bias results from using normatively (but not obviously) pro-
scribed information or (b) a given choice bias results from the fact that the op-
tion appears easiest to justify also happens to be the biased option.” Id. 
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model of decision making emphasizes that the decision maker 
may benefit from even bad or unlucky choices. Indeed, learning 
may be greatest in response to negative or unfavorable out-
comes.46 Thus, removing incentives to make good decisions may 
negatively impact activity levels and the amount of cognitive 
resources invested in activities, causing reductions in the 
amount and kinds of procedural- and self-knowledge gained. 
In considering the motivational effects of paternalism, it is 
useful to distinguish between paternalism imposed before and 
after a choice is made (i.e., ex ante versus ex post paternal-
ism).47 Ex ante paternalism reduces the incentive to search for 
information, carefully evaluate decision options, or develop 
good decision-making strategies. Ex post paternalism reduces 
the risk of thoughtless action, because the government will in-
sulate the decision maker from the consequences of the 
thoughtless choice. Thus, ex post paternalism operates as a 
form of social insurance for irrational behavior.48 
 
 46. See, e.g., Peter H. Ditto et al., Motivated Sensitivity to Preference-
Inconsistent Information, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 64 (1998) 
(reporting the results of three studies showing that preference-inconsistent 
feedback motivated more effortful processing and a greater sensitivity to in-
formation quality than preference-consistent feedback); id. at 54 (“A large 
body of research in social cognition suggests that negative information and 
negative affective states produce more systematic, detail-oriented cognitive 
processing than positive information and positive affective states.” (citations 
omitted)); Dan Zakay et al., Outcome Value and Early Warning Indications as 
Determinants of Willingness to Learn from Experience, 51 EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 150, 155 (2004). 
 47. Ex ante paternalism eliminates or reduces contractual freedom before 
a transaction occurs, including the imposition of cooling-off periods and infor-
mation-disclosure requirements. Bankruptcy protection and unconscionability 
challenges to contractual validity are the classic forms of ex post paternalism 
(recognizing, of course, that nonpaternalistic justifications may also be offered 
for both bankruptcy and the unconscionability doctrine), but the behavioral 
law and economics literature has given rise to new claims for judicial relief. 
See Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885, 888 (N.D. 
Ill. 2000) (noting that plaintiffs filed a claim for race discrimination in housing 
sales that relied on a theory of market manipulation via exploitation of psy-
chological bias as advanced by Hanson and Kysar). 
 48. Under some accounts of paternalism, if a party seeks state assistance 
for relief from a contract, as through an assertion of the unconscionability doc-
trine, then a court’s invalidation of the contract would not be a paternalistic 
act. See Shiffrin, supra note 12, at 210–11 Although it is not necessary to be-
lieve that an act of paternalism must be against the will of the assisted party, 
we need not resolve this issue here (for a discussion of the various paternalism 
issues raised by the unconscionability doctrine, see Shiffrin, supra note 12). 
For our purposes, ex post paternalism is simply shorthand for government as-
sistance available to protect a party from an earlier, supposedly irrational act. 
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We may therefore add two propositions that reflect the 
possibility that decision competence will be endogenous to the 
incentives created by a paternalistic policy: (4) ex ante pater-
nalism provides a negative incentive to invest in cognitive capi-
tal and exert cognitive effort, which may have adverse effects 
both inside and outside the regulated domain; (5) ex post pa-
ternalism provides a positive incentive to reduce cognitive ef-
fort and care in many domains. These propositions emphasize 
that paternalistic policies, on the margin, reduce an individ-
ual’s incentive to cultivate her cognitive capacity. That is, while 
a social planner may still determine that paternalism raises so-
cial welfare by some measure, one of the costs that must be 
considered is that biases themselves may be worsened or pro-
longed by the paternalistic policies. 
To be clear, we do not contend that Byrnes’s self-regulation 
model removes all concern about individual instances of poor 
judgment or choice,49 or that the self-regulation model provides 
a compelling argument against all paternalistic proposals. 
Rather, this empirically derived model highlights key processes 
in the development of decision-making competence that may be 
adversely affected by paternalistic policies, and it directs atten-
tion away from a static or piecemeal approach to judgment and 
decision making.50 Byrnes’s model stands out because it is one 
of the few attempts to integrate developmental research into 
the literature on judgment and decision making, despite the 
long-standing recognition of the importance of learning to cog-
nitive competence.51 
 
 49. Nor does Byrnes. Byrnes treats processing biases, including those 
arising from heuristics, as moderating factors that prevent optimal use of re-
sources or distract from goal attainment. See Byrnes, supra note 23, at 212. 
 50. Evidence that market experience reduces the incidence of some irra-
tional behaviors further supports this dynamic approach to judgment and de-
cision making. See, e.g., John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Mar-
ket Anomalies?, 118 Q.J. ECON. 41, 70 (2003) (finding “strong evidence that 
individual behavior converges to the neoclassical prediction as trading experi-
ence intensifies”). 
 51. Einhorn noted long ago the crucial relation of outcome feedback to de-
cision quality: 
A major variable in understanding heuristics is outcome feedback. 
Since outcome feedback is the main source of information for evaluat-
ing the quality of our decision/judgment rules, knowledge of how task 
variables both affect outcomes and influence the way outcomes are 
coded and stored in memory becomes critical in explaining how heu-
ristics are learned and used. 
Hillel J. Einhorn, Learning From Experience and Suboptimal Rules in Deci-
sion Making, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 268, 
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Also, we do not assume that all individuals exhibit the 
same potential for self-regulation of their decision making nor 
exhibit the same sensitivity to motivational effects on their ra-
tional behavior.52 As Byrnes notes, several personality traits 
serve to amplify or moderate the development of self-regulated 
decision making,53 and individuals learn at different rates.54 
However, in light of the growing empirical evidence that indi-
viduals differ in their ability to achieve high levels of decision 
competence,55 we believe it defensible to assume that individu-
als differ in their potential for self-regulation and to argue that, 
at the margin, paternalistic policies will interfere with the de-
velopment of decision-making competence. 
B. THE AUTOGENETIC EFFECTS OF PATERNALISM 
Acting paternalistically toward a particular group, on 
 
269 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). Reyna and Brainerd’s fuzzy-trace 
theory offers another important developmental perspective on judgment and 
decision making. See Valerie F. Reyna et al., Memory, Development, and Ra-
tionality: An Integrative Theory of Judgment and Decision Making, in EMERG-
ING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH, supra note 20, at 
201, 201; see also Judite V. Kokis et al., Heuristic and Analytic Processing: Age 
Trends and Associations With Cognitive Ability and Cognitive Styles, 83 J. EX-
PERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 26 (2002) (describing the alternative dual-
process approach to cognitive development). 
 52. A particularly important mediating variable is likely to be the indi-
vidual’s cognitive disposition, which encompasses the more flexible and malle-
able aspects of cognition (e.g., the disposition to weigh the opinions of others 
before forming a decision and the amount of time and effort expended to re-
solve decision-making problems) and which may be contrasted with cognitive 
capacity and the fairly stable and mechanical aspects of cognition (e.g., work-
ing memory capacity, perceptual speed). See, e.g., KEITH E. STANOVICH, WHO 
IS RATIONAL? STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN REASONING 157 (1999) 
(describing cognitive disposition as the “psychological mechanisms and strate-
gies that tend to generate characteristic behavioral tendencies and tactics” (ci-
tation omitted)). A person with low cognitive capacity but who is disposed to 
exert greater time and effort to the resolution of decisional problems may 
achieve results equal to or better than those achieved by persons with greater 
cognitive capacity. 
 53. See, e.g., Byrnes et al., supra note 23, at 1123 (emphasizing the mod-
erating effects of dogmatism and impulsivity). 
 54. See BYRNES, supra note 22, at 116 (“[S]elf-regulation is arrayed along 
a continuum ranging from complete dysregulation to complete self-regulation. 
Most of us fall somewhere in the middle of the continuum.”). 
 55. See Andrew M. Parker & Baruch Fischhoff, Decision-Making Compe-
tence: External Validation Through an Individual-Differences Approach, 18 J. 
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 21 (2005) (validating a measure of individual dif-
ferences in decision-making competence). See generally STANOVICH, supra note 
52 (demonstrating that individual differences implicate rationality). 
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grounds that the group is at risk of making irrational and inef-
ficient decisions, is likely to have autogenetic consequences.56 
First, the paternalist takes steps to restrict the contractual 
freedom of the regulated parties in the belief that the regulated 
parties lack full decision-making competence, Yet such contrac-
tual freedom is needed to develop competence in decision mak-
ing, as suggested above in our discussion of the self-regulation 
model of decision making. Thus, restriction of freedom to con-
tract is likely to reinforce the need for paternalistic oversight in 
the regulated domain and other domains.57 The perception of 
irrationality in the general public likewise leads to self-
fulfilling behaviors within the paternalist himself, such as in-
terpreting ambiguous evidence as evidence of irrational con-
sumer behavior or engaging in strict review of disconfirming 
data and lax review of confirmatory data.58 If the paternalist 
invests significant political capital to advance paternalistic 
policies, the pressure to find evidence confirming the need for 
the paternalism is likely to be significant as well, making the 
likelihood of a self-fulfilling prophecy quite high. 
Second, labeling a contractual domain an area of consumer 
exploitation is likely to lead to ex post facto requests for pater-
nalistic intervention.59 Thus, in addition to paternalism’s inter-
ference with individual learning, the willingness of courts to 
 
 56. Kukla uses the term “autogenetic” as shorthand for beliefs that lead to 
self-fulfilling or self-negating prophecies. See Andre Kukla, The Structure of 
Self-Fulfilling and Self-Negating Prophecies, 4 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 5, 5 
(1994). 
 57. Cf. Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmak-
ing: An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Man-
agement of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 362 (1986) (“[I]ntervention to cor-
rect a market failure may have far more powerful secondary effects on 
consumer satisfaction than has been commonly acknowledged . . . . [T]he social 
engineer must be sensitive to the damage that is likely to be caused to the me-
chanics by which individuals regulate their choices.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Dale T. Miller & William Turnbull, Expectancies and Inter-
personal Processes, 37 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 233, 244 (1986) (“The influence of 
erroneous expectancies is not only manifest in the behavior of targets. In spite 
of objective evidence to the contrary, perceivers may conclude that their expec-
tancies have been confirmed. To the extent that confirmation is ‘in the eye of 
the beholder,’ stereotypes and other false expectancies will persist even in the 
face of objective disconfirmation.”). For a discussion of such confirmatory bi-
ases within behavioral law and economics, see Gregory Mitchell, Taking Be-
havioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behav-
ioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1911, 2019 (2002). 
 59. See supra note 47. For additional cases in which plaintiffs have re-
quested paternalistic protection from the courts for supposed manipulation of 
cognitive or motivational biases, see Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 1166 n.12. 
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engage in paternalistic oversight reduces the risk of personal 
liability for poor choices and increases the likelihood that even 
rational actors will seek relief from choices that turn out badly. 
In other words, the motivational effects on litigants and law-
yers of a paternalistic attitude in the courts add to paternal-
ism’s autogenetic prospects. 
Third, changing the market by restricting the profit exploi-
tation opportunities of firms should cause rational firms to al-
ter their exploitation strategies to preserve their profits.60 Pa-
ternalistic intervention thus breeds demand for more 
paternalistic interventions, as the paternalist tries to keep pace 
with the arbitrage efforts of firms seeking to exploit cognitive 
biases.61 Such interference with competitive market forces may 
adversely affect the development of rational behavior, because 
highly competitive free markets tend to foster rational choice 
better than less competitive and nontraditional markets.62 One 
reason that rational choice theory fares best in highly competi-
tive markets seems to be that these markets provide “external 
scaffolding” for individual choice that channels behavior in util-
ity-maximizing directions, while the environment in less com-
petitive markets allows suboptimal behavior to survive and, in 
some cases, even prosper.63 Thus, to the extent economic effi-
 
 60. Cf. Frey & Eichenberger, supra note 42, at 219 (“Firms not only have 
an incentive to exploit the given stock of anomalies but also an interest in ex-
panding the existing capacity of anomalies (which allows them to raise exploi-
tation). New anomalies can be detected by investing resources in appropriate 
research, and known anomalies can be combined in such a way that they are 
magnified.”); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 1424–25 (“[I]ndividuals’ irra-
tionality makes them] susceptible to manipulation by those actors in a position 
to influence the decisionmaking context. Moreover, the actors in the dominant 
position must capitalize on this manipulation or eventually be displaced from 
the market.”). 
 61. Alternatively, the paternalistic intervention may drive some firms 
from the market, with possibly adverse effects on pricing in the market. 
 62. ANDY CLARK, BEING THERE: PUTTING BRAIN, BODY, AND WORLD TO-
GETHER AGAIN 183 (1997) (“[T]raditional economic theory nicely models choice 
in competitive posted price markets and in certain restricted experimental 
studies.”). 
 63. Clark explains how markets can foster rational choice: 
[T]he crucial factor distinguishing the successful and unsuccessful 
cases (of the use of neoclassical, substantive-rationality-assuming 
theory) is the availability of a structurally determined theory of inter-
ests. In cases where the overall structuring environment acts so as to 
select in favor of actions which are restricted so as to conform to a 
specific model of preferences, neoclassical theory works. And it works 
because individual psychology no longer matters: the “preferences” 
are imposed by the wider situation and need not be echoed in individ-
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ciency is the primary goal, improving competition rather than 
protecting individuals from their inefficient irrational tenden-
cies is likely the better long-term strategy. 
II.  SIMPLE ECONOMIC MODELS OF BEHAVIOR 
UNDER PATERNALISM 
In order to make our somewhat vague claims about the 
psychological and social effects of paternalism more concrete 
and testable, we now promulgate economic models of decision-
making behavior under paternalism. These models isolate the 
variables likely to be important to cost-benefit calculations re-
garding alternative courses of action. Although there is some 
evidence that individuals do engage in such cost-benefit calcu-
lations,64 it is not assumed that individuals consciously engage 
in such cost-benefit calculations in all instances. Rather, em-
pirical testing may reveal that in some situations individuals 
engage in explicit cost-benefit reasoning along the lines we 
suggest but that individuals also develop conditioned responses 
to particular choice situations that reflect implicit or prior ex-
plicit cost-benefit analyses consistent with our hypotheses.65 
 
ual psychology. 
Id. Markets are thus just a special case of what Clark calls “external scaffold-
ing” of thought: “Language and culture, in particular, emerge as advanced 
species of external scaffolding ‘designed’ to squeeze maximum coherence and 
utility from fundamentally short-sighted, special-purpose, internally frag-
mented minds.” Id. at 33. According to Clark, “we are masters at structuring 
our physical and social worlds so as to press complex coherent behaviors 
from . . . unruly resources. . . . Our brains make the world smart so that we 
can be dumb in peace!” Id. at 180. 
 64. First, some individuals, particularly those with training in economics, 
employ cost-benefit reasoning in their day-to-day lives. See, e.g., Richard P. 
Larrick et al., Teaching the Use of Cost-Benefit Reasoning in Everyday Life, 1 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 362 (1990); Richard P. Larrick et al., Who Uses Cost-Benefit 
Rules of Choice? Implications for the Normative Status of Microeconomic The-
ory, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 331 (1993). 
Second, all individuals seem to possess some ability to shift from intuitive 
thought into a more deliberative mode of thought in which the costs and bene-
fits of alternative courses of action are more carefully considered. See, e.g., 
ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 106 (1999). 
 65. An intriguing possibility is that the brain’s dopaminergic system op-
erates on principles that approximate economic norms for evaluation, with 
subconscious, neuron-level valuations of potential future rewards becoming 
associated with different courses of action and activities causing changes in a 
subset of dopamine neurons to improve the system’s ability to predict error 
regarding future behaviors. See P. Read Montague & Gregory S. Berns, Neural 
Economics and the Biological Substrates of Valuation, 36 NEURON 265, 281 
(2002); see also Peter Dayan & Bernard W. Balleine, Reward, Motivation, and 
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A. EX ANTE PATERNALISM 
In a world of ex ante paternalism, choices are restricted 
such that options disfavored by policy makers are removed 
from an individual’s choice set or are taxed at a relatively high 
level to discourage individuals from choosing them.66 While this 
kind of paternalism has the potential to stop individuals from 
making “mistakes” in their choices, it is not clear that this mis-
take avoidance is entirely salutary, as discussed above. Specifi-
cally, in a situation in which there are no artificial constraints 
on the choice set, individuals have the incentive to invest effort 
in searching for the choice that will maximize their utility. 
Operationally, the individual faces the following maximiza-
tion problem in which her choice of effort (e), which involves 
some expenditure C, determines the probability (p) that she 
will choose the good that provides her with high utility ( HU ) as 
opposed to the good providing low utility ( LU ): 
( ) ( )1H LeMax p e U p e U C e⋅ + − − ⋅⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
which yields the solution 
[ ]H Lp U U Ce
∂⎛ ⎞ − =⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠  
The first order condition implies that an individual’s choice 
of  search  effort  will  be  determined  by: (1) the productivity of  
search p
e
∂⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠  or  how  much  each  unit  of  effort  increases  the 
 
Reinforcement Learning, 36 NEURON 285, 293 (2002); Paul W. Glimcher, Deci-
sions, Decisions, Decisions: Choosing a Biological Science of Choice, 36 NEU-
RON 323, 328–29 (2002). But see Colin Camerer et al., Neuroeconomics: How 
Neuroscience Can Inform Economics, 43 J. ECON. LITERATURE 9, 55 (2005) 
(“Our view is that establishing a neural basis for some rational choice princi-
ples will not necessarily vindicate the approach as widely applied to hu-
mans.”). 
 66. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber, Smoking’s Internalities, 25 REGULATION 
52 (2002/2003); Jonathan Gruber & Botond Koszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”? 
Theory and Evidence, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1261 (2001). Note that in these articles, 
the taxation of cigarettes is advocated not because of the ability of taxation to 
internalize the cost of external effects on third parties or even to account for 
the costs that smoking imposes on the public health system (so-called fiscal 
externalities), but rather such taxation is advocated to remedy “internalities” 
(i.e., effects on a future self ). For a more direct exposition of this position, see 
Jonathan Gruber & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers 
Happier? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8872, 2002), 
available at http://nber.org/papers/w8872.pdf. 
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likelihood that the “right” good will be chosen;67 (2) the value of 
choosing the correct as opposed to the incorrect good  [ ]H LU U−  
which is represented by the utility differential generated by the 
two goods; and (3) the cost of effort. 
As long as search effort is costly, an individual will likely 
accept an expected outcome in which she sometimes chooses in-
correctly because the marginal value of increased search, after 
some point, will not exceed the marginal cost of the effort re-
quired by the search.68 However, in some ways, this one-time 
static model of behavior undervalues the benefit provided by 
search effort. That is, in many cases, effort in the current pe-
riod provides benefits beyond the choice at hand. In the future, 
if faced with the same choice, the individual’s cost of search ef-
fort will be reduced if she invested effort earlier.69 Effectively, 
search effort is tantamount to a learning process and the stock 
of information gathered during that process is accessible when 
the decision must be made again in the future. This search ef-
fort may even pay dividends in situations in which an individ-
ual must make decisions in different, though related contexts.70 
An individual’s cognitive capital can, in an abstract sense, be 
divided into specific capital which is helpful in making the 
same decision in the future, and general capital, which will be 
helpful in making decisions that have elements in common 
with decisions made in the past. Viewed in this way, any cur-
rent search effort contributes to durable cognitive capital which 
generates lower search costs in the future across a wide array 
of decisions.71 
 
 67. Note that since we can normalize effort units in an arbitrary way, this 
derivative term can also be interpreted as an elasticity. 
 68. This assumes an interior solution exists for the problem. 
 69. Alternately, one could frame this as improved productivity of search 
for the same cost. 
 70. It is also possible that the search process will lead to domain-general 
knowledge and strategies that pay dividends in even seemingly unrelated con-
texts. For instance, learning to think in an active, open-minded way, such that 
one considers opposing positions and counterarguments to one’s initial posi-
tion, has been shown effective at debiasing across several domains. See, e.g., 
Linda Babcock et al., Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 913, 920 (1997); Asher Koriat et al., Reasons for Confi-
dence, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 107, 116 
(1980); Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy 
for Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1239 (1984); 
Thomas Mussweiler et al., Overcoming the Inevitable Anchoring Effect: Con-
sidering the Opposite Compensates for Selective Accessibility, 26 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1142, 1149 (2000). 
 71. In terms of the self-regulation model of decision making, such a search 
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In the choice-constrained world envisioned by some behav-
ioral law and economics scholars, this search process is avoided 
or diminished to the extent that the benefits of search effort are 
significantly reduced. In the maximization problem laid out 
above, it would be as if p were exogenously set by the paternal-
istic policy maker. If p is exogenous, and C is greater than zero, 
the individual will not undertake any search effort.72 Her 
choice will instead be made for her. This result is an applica-
tion of the concept of moral hazard drawn from the economics 
of insurance literature. Specifically, a moral hazard arises 
when an individual receives no (or an attenuated) personal 
benefit from her productive activity (generally, in this context, 
the benefit comes in the form of a reduced cost); therefore, her 
incentive to engage in the productive activity is diminished. 
Her welfare, from this particular consumption decision, will 
primarily be a function of the probability that the policy maker 
has chosen correctly for her (Ψ ). Formally, restricting atten-
tion to the one-time decision case, the individual will be better 
off in the choice-constrained world if  
( ) ( ) ( )* * *1 1H L H LU U p e U p e U C e⎡ ⎤Ψ ⋅ + −Ψ > + − − ⋅⎣ ⎦  
where *e is the individual’s optimal level of search effort in the 
nonpaternalistic setting. 
Simplified, this condition requires that the expected benefit  
of the paternalistic system,  ( )H LU UΨ − , must be greater than 
the expected  outcome of  the search model  net of  search costs, ( ) ( )* *H Lp e U U C e⋅ − − ⋅  ,  if paternalism is to benefit an indivi-  
dual. Such a condition will hold if the policy maker is almost as 
likely to choose correctly as the individual is, where the allow-
able gap in likelihoods is determined by the cost of search effort 
relative to the utility gap between the correct and incorrect out- 
 
can lead to gains in crystallized intelligence (acquisition of facts) or fluid intel-
ligence (acquisition of problem-solving strategies) of a domain-specific or do-
main-general nature. See Margaret E. Beier & Phillip L. Ackerman, Age, Abil-
ity, and the Role of Prior Knowledge on the Acquisition of New Domain 
Knowledge: Promising Results in a Real-World Learning Environment, 20 
PSYCHOL. & AGING 341, 341 (2005) (“Fluid intelligence (Gf . . . , as the process-
ing and reasoning components of intelligence) has been identified as an apti-
tude for learning, whereas crystallized intelligence (Gc) is generally defined as 
the knowledge acquired through education and experience.”). 
 72. In the case where the choice set is reduced to some lower number of 
options but still allows some choice, incentives to invest effort in search will be 
reduced, as will be the case where the policy maker uses tax policy to induce a 
certain choice rather than by constraining the choice set directly. 
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− . That is, if the policy maker has a lower likeli- 
hood of choosing correctly for the individual, we might still fa-
vor paternalism if the cost of search effort is very high or if the 
gap between the correct and incorrect outcomes is very small 
(e.g., perhaps the policy maker has realized economies of scale 
in information acquisition that the individual cannot, or the 
choice alternatives differ little, as in certain insurance mar-
kets).73 
Note that in the above analysis we ignore the cost to the 
policy maker of determining which choice to impose. This omis-
sion seems reasonable if the population is generally homoge-
nous in preferences, or if, for the choice at hand, there is a 
great deal of agreement regarding what constitutes the correct 
choice. In these cases, the policy maker enjoys economies of 
scale in its own decision costs since, effectively, one choice is 
made for the entire population, whereas in the nonpaternalistic 
world, each individual would undertake her own search costs to 
arrive at what would end up being a common choice. 
However, the reasonable scope of paternalism shrinks con-
siderably when there is more heterogeneity of preferences 
among the population. As heterogeneity grows, if the policy 
maker does not have the ability to offer different choice sets to 
different people  based  upon  their  underlying  preferences, Ψ  
will decrease relative to ( )*p e . Also, as heterogeneity grows, if 
the policy maker attempts to offer different constrained choice 
sets to individuals based on their preferences, the economies of 
scale in search costs for the policy maker break down. 
In homogenous populations, however, even if the formal 
case for paternalism strengthens, the practical case is weak-
ened. Individuals with similar preferences will be able to 
economize on information by simply aping those around them 
in their choices. Further, in such situations, market pressures 
will induce firms to provide goods and services that satisfy 
 
 73. For instance, Baker and colleagues find that more actively managed 
funds, in terms of turnover, exhibit significantly better performance than 
funds with low turnover. However, funds in the highest turnover quintile only 
outperform those in the lowest quintile by thirty-four basis points on an annu-
alized basis. Thus, if paternalistic regulations prohibited individuals from in-
vesting in high-turnover funds, some people would be made worse off, but the 
effect would be relatively small. See Malcolm Baker et al., Can Mutual Fund 
Managers Pick Stocks? Evidence from Their Trades Prior to Earnings An-
nouncements 26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10685, 
2004), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10685.pdf. 
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those common preferences, weeding out the goods and services 
that individuals do not want. 
The strongest case for paternalism centers around the case 
where an individual’s optimal likelihood of choosing correctly is 
low relative to the policy maker’s ability to choose correctly for 
the individual because the relationship between her effort and 
likelihood of choosing correctly is low (or, isomorphicly, because 
her cost of effort is very high). That is, we would view paternal-
ism most favorably when it is relatively costly for an individual 
to improve her decision making (e.g., in high-stakes decisions 
where choices are irrevocable and there is little prior chance for 
learning). Again, as indicated in the simple model above, in a 
one-shot transaction, the efficiency of this paternalism depends 
on the policy maker choosing correctly. However, this welfare 
analysis ignores the capital stock aspect of individuals invest-
ing in cognitive effort. That is, if individuals are effectively pre-
cluded from engaging in search at time t because of the policy 
maker’s decision to constrain the choice set, the individual will 
have a relatively smaller stock of cognitive capital to draw upon 
in a similar choice at time t+1. 
In terms of specific capital, this diminution of the capital 
stock might not be very costly if the paternalist continues to 
constrain choice in this area for the foreseeable future. How-
ever, unless the paternalist constrains choice in very many con-
texts, the decrease in general cognitive capital has the potential 
to harm the individual. That is, while in the unconstrained 
world an individual’s cost of cognitive effort will decrease over 
time because she has contributed to her capital stock through 
prior decision-making processes and learning, her decision-
making capacities will not be exercised in the paternalistic do-
main. This unintended cost of paternalistic policies reflects a 
sort of “cognitive hazard.” 
Assuming that policy makers cannot constrain choices in 
every context (e.g., due to excessive policy-making and en-
forcement costs) or do not wish to do so because of the existence 
of sufficiently diverse populations or concerns about personal 
rights in some contexts, then an optimally designed paternalis-
tic system needs to consider the cost of this cognitive hazard. 
Practically speaking, a social planner would need to examine 
the benefits of constraining choice by comparing the expected 
gain from choice constraint relative to the individual’s choice in 
the unconstrained world in which she optimally chooses her 
cognitive effort level, recognizing possible reductions in cogni-
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tive capital that will be occasioned by constraining the choice 
set. Presumably, adding this element to the calculation would 
not reduce the set of welfare-enhancing paternalistic interven-
tions to the null set, but it would raise the bar for a policy of ex 
ante paternalism. 
B. EX POST PATERNALISM 
If behavioral biases are not completely exogenous, then 
they will be sensitive to changes in the net costs generated by 
the bias as well.74 To the extent that paternalistic interventions 
shield an individual from the costs generated by her deviations 
from rationality,75 on the margin, she will have greater incen-
tive to exhibit the bias, or, perhaps more intuitively, she will 
have less of an incentive to surmount her biases. The insurance 
generated by ex post paternalist protections has the potential 
to generate the kind of moral hazard that is commonly associ-
ated with insurance.76 
If cognitive biases are responsive to incentives, the effi-
ciency arguments advanced by supporters of ex post paternal-
ism are drawn into question. That is, if an individual recog-
nizes that she will be protected from the consequences of her 
 
 74. For a discussion of evidence in support of the view that individuals are 
sensitive to the costs of psychological bias, and that they often engage in self-
corrective actions in attempts to counter the effects of bias, sometimes with 
success and sometimes without success, see Kahneman, supra note 20, at 710–
12; see also Diego Fernandez-Duque et al., Executive Attention and Metacogni-
tive Regulation, 9 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 288, 293 (2000) (noting that 
“[n]ormal subjects have the ability to internally evaluate their own perform-
ance, detecting errors even in the absence of any external feedback,” although 
the authors do not specifically discuss nationality errors); Frey & Eichenber-
ger, supra note 42, at 223 (“Individuals falling prey to an anomaly are often 
aware that they act in a non-rational way and that they could improve their 
utility or profit by adjusting their behavior. Perception is the more likely, the 
less costly is a comparison with non-anomalous behavior.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Korobkin, Standard Form Contracts, supra note 3, at 1207 
(“By recognizing purchasers’ bounded rationality as the most important root 
cause of inefficiency in form contracts, courts can modify their use of uncon-
scionability analysis to increase both social welfare generally and buyer wel-
fare specifically.”). 
 76. Arguably, moral hazard as it is invoked in the economics literature is 
simply an application of the law of demand, which states that as the price of 
an activity decreases, an individual will increase her consumption of the activ-
ity. See Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Subsidizing Addiction: Do 
State Health Insurance Mandates Increase Alcohol Consumption, 35 J. LEG. 
STUD. 175, 177 (2006); Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, The Effect of 
Abortion Legalization on Sexual Behavior: Evidence from Sexually Transmit-
ted Diseases, 32 J. LEG. STUD. 407, 412 (2003). 
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decisions either because of statutory proclamation or because of 
her knowledge that courts have acted paternalistically toward 
others in similar situations, she will not invest an optimal level 
of cognitive effort. Thus, the short-term efficiency gain posited 
by the paternalists may not offset the efficiency loss that will 
apply to parties in the future. 
As a simple illustration of this relationship, take an indi-
vidual who can achieve either of two utility levels in a given 
transaction: the outcome that would occur if there were no cog-
nitive limitation present ( )HU and the outcome resulting in the 
presence of the cognitive limitation ( )LU . By assumption, HU  
is strictly greater than LU . The individual can exert greater 
cognitive effort ( )e  to increase her probability ( )p of attaining 
HU , but each additional unit of effort reduces her utility by C. 
Further, she has some expectation that in the event she real-
izes LU as the end state of the transaction, the courts will com-
pensate her with some award that increases her utility by I. 
In deciding on the level of cognitive effort she wishes to ex-
pend, the individual faces the following maximization problem: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1H LeMax p e U p e U p e I C e+ − + − − ⋅⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
Effectively, the individual is maximizing her expected util-
ity from the transaction, including the insurance provided to 
her by the paternalistic institution, net of the disutility she ex-
periences by exerting increased cognitive effort.77 
The result of this maximization problem can be character-
ized by the function’s first order condition: 
( )H Lp U U I Ce
∂ − − =∂  
The condition presented above has the intuitive implication 
that an individual will continue to expend effort up to the point 
where doing so is cost justified. That is, given that each addi-
tional unit of effort decreases her utility by C, she will only ex-
pend additional effort if her expected gain in utility of doing so 
is greater than C. 
It is immediately apparent that if the difference between 
 
 77. This cognitive effort cost could take many forms. The most direct 
would simply be the time cost of considering the transaction at greater length 
in order to determine whether the individual is receiving the greatest gain 
possible from the bargain. 
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HU  and LU is entirely offset by the “insurance” payment pro-
vided by the paternalistic institution, the individual will ex-
pend no cognitive effort.78 This stands in contrast to the result 
that exists in a world with no paternalism. If there is no insur-
ance in the model, the individual will exert some positive level 
of cognitive effort as long as H LU U> . 
The situation becomes more acute if a given cognitive limi-
tation worsens through reinforcement. That is, if an individual 
is protected from the costs of her limitation in period 1, the 
magnitude of the limitation is larger in period 2 because of con-
ditioning or adaptation. Another way to understand the effect 
is that the cost of cognitive effort in period t decreases as cogni-
tive capital is built up through exercising cognitive faculties in 
periods prior to t. Effectively then, paternalist protection not 
only generates a moral hazard in which an individual underin-
vests in cognitive effort during the current period, but it also 
reduces an individual’s cognitive abilities in future periods 
relative to the situation in which no protection is provided. In 
the no-protection case, an individual will have an incentive to 
consider the effect of current expenditures on cognitive effort on 
the cost of future cognitive effort. The presence of insurance 
against the costs of cognitive mistakes currently and the expec-
tation of insurance in the future both reduce cognitive invest-
ments. This phenomenon is the manifestation of our cognitive 
hazard concept in the context of ex post paternalistic interven-
tions.79 
 
 78. In fact, in such a situation, the individual will be at a corner solution 
in which she would like to expend negative amounts of effort if she were com-
pensated for doing so (i.e., if she could face a negative cost of effort). 
 79. Although the concept of cognitive hazard, in principle, can be seen as 
an extension of the moral hazard idea, it is analytically useful to keep the two 
phenomena distinct in any welfare analysis given the different time frames 
that are relevant for each. That is, because the costs of cognitive hazards are 
only realized in the future, they should be discounted appropriately by a social 
planner, while the costs associated with moral hazards will be realized at the 
time the current decision takes place. For example, assume an individual can 
invest $1 worth of effort to guarantee that she will achieve the high utility 
outcome (which exceeds the low utility outcome by $5) now and whenever she 
is in a similar situation in the future, but she has no incentive to make that 
investment due to the existence of insurance provided by the paternalist which 
involves a transfer of $5 to the individual and administrative costs of $1. The 
social cost of the moral hazard in this situation is zero because the individual’s 
cost of effort equals the social cost of administering the paternalistic insur-
ance. However, the social cost of her cognitive hazard (i.e., the failure to im-
prove cognitive capital to draw on in future situations) will be the present 
value of $1 for every instance in the future in which this transaction arises 
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C. A ROLE FOR EDUCATION 
The cost of cognitive effort, and hence the magnitude of a 
revealed limitation, will not only be dependent upon an indi-
vidual’s own internal investments, but may be influenced by 
external investments in the form of education. That is, in some 
circumstances, individuals can learn debiasing techniques that 
increase the likelihood of rational choice.80 
One of the simplest ways to add education to our primary 
model is to assume that the probability of choosing the correct 
option is a function of education inputs (E) and cognitive effort 
inputs (e).81 Thus, if an individual were free to improve her de-
 
again using the relevant social discount rate. Had the individual invested in 
effort during the first transaction, by assumption, there would be no need for 
the paternalist to remedy her mistake through the insurance mechanism in 
the future. If, instead, the insurance program entails administrative costs that 
exceed the individual’s cost of effort, say by $2, the moral hazard cost of the 
original intervention would be $1 which represents the differential resources 
consumed by the paternalistic remedy relative to what the individual would 
have needed to expend to reach the high utility. This is a current cost of the 
system and so it is not discounted, while the cognitive hazard costs will be dis-
counted as before. Thus, as long as the social planner assumes a positive dis-
count rate, moral hazard costs (i.e., costs that are currently realized) will be 
weighted relatively more heavily than cognitive hazard costs (i.e., costs that 
will be realized in the future). 
 80. Given the relative neglect of statistical and economic training at the 
compulsory education levels, it should not be particularly surprising that peo-
ple often evince poor comprehension of statistical and economics concepts. See 
PETER SEDLMEIER, IMPROVING STATISTICAL REASONING: THEORETICAL MOD-
ELS AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 196 (1999) (discussing the low levels of sta-
tistical education at primary and secondary school levels); William B. Walstad, 
Economic Education in U.S. High Schools, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 195, 208 (2001) 
(“Less than half of all high school graduates take a well-defined high school 
economics course at present.”). Nevertheless, a number of educational pro-
grams have been shown effective at debiasing. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law 
and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law 
and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 87–94 (2002) (summariz-
ing evidence on the relationship between education and rationality); id. at 
132–35 (summarizing evidence on procedural debiasing techniques). See gen-
erally Richard P. Larrick, Debiasing, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK ON JUDGMENT 
AND DECISION MAKING 316 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004) (de-
scribing debiasing strategies for individuals). For a recent study suggesting 
that education can have positive effects on the expression of psychological bi-
ases, see Daniel J. Benjamin & Jesse Shapiro, Does Cognitive Ability Reduce 
Psychological Bias? 25–26 (Feb. 25, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=675264 (reporting that although the primary 
finding of the study was “a robust positive relationship between cognitive abil-
ity and normative decision-making,” there is some evidence that “seems to 
suggest that human capital policy may indeed be able to improve economic de-
cision-making.” (footnote omitted)). 
 81. Operationally, this could be modeled in a number of ways. We choose 
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cision-making process by investing in education at the cost of G 
per educational unit and cognitive effort at the cost of C per ef-
fort unit, she would face the following maximization problem: 
( ) ( )
,
, 1 ,H Le EMax p e E U p e E U C e G E⋅ + − − ⋅ − ⋅⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
generating the following first order conditions: 
[ ]H Lp U U Ce
∂⎛ ⎞ − =⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠  
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This result holds that the individual will set her marginal 
rate of substitution82 between cognitive effort and education 
equal to the cost ratio of the two inputs. Thus, as long as there 
is some gain from improving p,83 as cognitive effort grows more 
expensive relative to education, the individual will invest in 
more education and vice versa. 
However, if the individual is making her decision within a 
paternalistic institution such that her choice set is censored or 
such that she will be saved from making a bad decision, she 
will invest less in both education and cognitive effort, generat-
ing the same short-term moral hazards discussed above. This 
will also generate the longer-term cognitive hazard discussed 
above, as the individual has less incentive to invest in her cog-
nitive capital through effort or education. 
 
to present a model in which education and effort are substitute inputs in the 
probability function, but the intuition would not change if the two inputs were 
modeled as complements such that p was a function of effort times education 
or such that education reduced the per unit cost of cognitive effort. 
 82. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 54 (1995). 
 83. This will be the case as long as the gap between UH and UL (net of the 
implicit insurance payment available if this is a case of ex ante paternalism) is 
smaller than the minimum of C and G. That is, as long as there is an interior 
solution to the optimization problem. 
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The addition of education to the model, however, suggests 
an alternate route through which paternalist policy makers can 
affect an individual’s chances of choosing the correct option 
from a set, namely, the paternalist may subsidize the individ-
ual’s educational inputs. This option, however, is not a perfect 
one. While under most circumstances such a subsidy will in-
crease aggregate cognitive inputs (i.e., effort plus education), 
there will also be some substitution effect whereby, on the 
margin, the individual will decrease her own cognitive effort 
and education inputs. That is, it will generally not be the case 
that the paternalist can increase aggregate inputs one for one. 
If the paternalist provides a subsidy paying for one unit of edu-
cation, the individual’s aggregate input units will increase by 
less than one unit. 
The provision of paternalistic education subsidies could be 
justified, however, under several conditions. Most obviously, if 
the paternalist can provide education at a lower per unit cost, 
even taking the individual’s substitution into account, paternal-
ist education provision would be efficient. This should be the 
case when there are economies of scale involved in cognitive 
education. Educational subsidies could also be justified in cases 
where individuals are assumed to save (i.e., invest in cognitive 
capital) too little due to peculiar discounting functions,84 so long 
as this limited savings tendency generates some kind of rele-
vant externality.85 
This alternative paternalistic policy tool, and the recogni-
tion that individuals will react in complex ways to paternalistic 
policy interventions, implies that optimal paternalism will 
typically involve more than simply identifying a bias and coun-
teracting it directly through legal and policy institutions. In-
stead, optimal paternalism represents a mechanism design 
problem in which a social planner must consider using more 
than just the sledgehammer of constraining choice sets ex ante 
or providing implicit social insurance through some form of ex 
 
 84. For example, if an individual exhibits hyperbolic discounting as hy-
pothesized by Laibson and others. See, e.g., David Laibson, Golden Eggs and 
Hyperbolic Discounting, 62 Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997). 
 85. As in Gruber’s “internality” argument, in which the present self does 
not take the well-being of the future self into account, or when there are so-
called fiscal externalities, where an individual’s poor decisions affect others 
through governmental programs. See Edgar K. Browning, The Myth of Fiscal 
Externalities, 27 PUB. FIN. REV. 3 (1999). For example, given the U.S. welfare 
system, it may be the case that we want to induce individuals to save more so 
that they do not end up drawing resources from public assistance programs.  
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post paternalism. In addition to those tools, the paternalist 
should consider the indirect tool of education. Further, as im-
plied above, the paternalist should recognize that short-term 
gains from interventions may be mitigated by long-term losses 
in cognitive capital, at least in some contexts for some indi-
viduals. 
III.  OPTIMAL DESIGN OF PATERNALISTIC 
INTERVENTIONS 
In this Part, we consider the factors likely to affect optimal 
institutional design undertaken to counter supposed inefficien-
cies associated with irrational behavior. A social planner 
charged with designing an optimal system would presumably 
have as control variables the degree to which choices are con-
strained or the level of insurance provided to biased individuals 
and the level of debiasing education available. As noted above, 
choice sets may be constrained directly or indirectly through 
taxes, and social insurance may take the form of judicial deci-
sions (including bankruptcy decrees) to transfer wealth from an 
individual who benefits from another individual’s bias to the 
biased individual herself. Imposing no choice-set constraint or 
offering no insurance would represent a laissez-faire stance in 
which there is no paternalistic oversight of the biased behavior. 
The education variable would involve providing resources for 
decision-making education or debiasing in the existing school 
system or through subsidies to market providers of debiasing 
education.86 
Our psychological and economic accounts of behavior under 
paternalism suggest that the optimal mix of paternalistic and 
educational interventions will depend upon the following fac-
tors: (1) the efficiency loss due to current underinvestment in 
cognitive effort and education; (2) the capitalized loss of the fu-
ture return due to current underinvestment in cognitive effort 
 
 86. In addition to making educational investments to improve one’s own 
decision-making competence, a common strategy to overcome personal limita-
tions is to rely on the expertise of others. See BYRNES, supra note 22, at 52 (“In 
summary, the data suggests that certain forms of advice seeking increase with 
age, others decrease, and others stay the same. From the standpoint of [the 
self-regulation model], self-regulated decision-makers seek advice only when it 
is necessary and seek it in appropriate ways.”). A social planner could be des-
ignated to choose the appropriate level of education and the most efficient mix 
of educational providers. If it seems unlikely that individuals will seek out 
education on their own, it might be useful to provide it through existing com-
pulsory schooling. 
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and education; (3) the costs of private effort and education and 
the costs of public education subsidies; (4) the efficiency gains 
from limiting decision-making mistakes; (5) the efficiency costs 
of the policy maker choosing incorrectly for some individuals;87 
(6) the welfare gains of discouraging the exploitation of cogni-
tive biases; and (7) the nondistortionary costs of developing and 
enforcing the constrained choice set and paternalistic insurance 
system (i.e., administrative costs). 
Unfortunately, very little empirical information exists to 
help us place parameters on these factors with respect to the 
consequences of particular anomalies (i.e., with respect to fac-
tors four and six in particular),88 because most paternalistic 
proposals within behavioral law and economics proceed from 
little more than an identification of a cognitive bias that may 
explain a pattern of seemingly inefficient choices.89 In many in-
stances it is extremely difficult to tie apparent real-world inef-
ficiencies to a market failure based on irrational behavior as 
opposed to some other defect in the marketplace,90 and in some 
 
 87. This cost is most obvious in the constrained choice set case. However, 
costs of this nature also accrue to ex post paternalistic interventions to the ex-
tent that they inject uncertainty in transactions (e.g., reliance on contract 
terms). 
 88. Cf. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related 
Risk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213, 255 (2001) (asserting that proponents arguing for 
enterprise liability within products liability law on grounds that markets ex-
ploit psychological biases to manipulate consumer perceptions of product risks 
“fail[ ] to provide a serious quantitative assessment of the extent of market 
manipulation”). 
 89. This practice follows from the practice within psychology to focus on 
demonstrating deviations from rationality rather than examining the costs, 
adaptivity, or boundaries of such deviations. See Krueger & Funder, supra 
note 20, at 313 (noting that mainstream social psychology’s “prevalent re-
search strategy has been to propose a prescriptive norm for social behavior or 
cognition and then to demonstrate that human performance falls short of it.”); 
Ralph Hertwig & Annika Wallin, Out of the Theoretical Cul-de-Sac, 27 BEHAV. 
& BRAIN SCI. 342, 343 (2004) (“Social psychology and related fields have over-
sold violations of behavioral and cognitive norms.”). There appears, however, 
to be some movement toward a more balanced view of human cognition within 
psychology, if not behavioral economics. See Andreas Ortmann & Michal 
Ostatnicky, Proper Experimental Design and Implementation Are Necessary 
Conditions For a Balanced Social Psychology, 27 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 352, 
352 (2004) (“[A]lthough the unbalanced view of humans as cognitive misers 
seems slowly but surely on its way out in social psychology and judgment and 
decision-making, the heuristics-and-biases program, which seems mostly re-
sponsible for the unbalanced view, has during the past decade invaded eco-
nomics with little resistance . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 90. For an illustration of the difficulty in quantifying welfare costs attrib-
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cases even designating the optimal behavior is difficult.91 Given 
 
utable to irrational behavior, see Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded 
Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482 
(2002). Tor does an admirable job considering possible explanations for exces-
sive business-startup behavior from both rational choice and bounded-
rationality perspectives and considering the positive and negative effects of 
excessive-startup behavior. Ultimately, however, he notes the difficulty of 
reaching firm conclusions about the efficiency effects of irrational behavior in 
this context: 
  In principle, an effective detection and prevention of some nega-
tive net present value entry at the margin could be beneficial. The 
problem is, however, that there is no easy means of quantifying with 
any certainty the benefits and costs of entry. Measuring the direct 
deadweight losses of negative expected value entry is the least diffi-
cult, since—at least in principle—one could calculate the number of 
failed entrants per industry and the average costs they have sunk 
into their ventures. The calculation of net losses would be more com-
plex, though, for those entrants who obtain some profits before exiting 
the market. 
  It is even less clear, moreover, how to measure the externalities of 
entry . . . . 
  An examination of the quantities that must be measured for any 
quantification of the positive externalities of negative expected value 
entry reveals another impenetrable maze. 
Id. at 546. Tor concludes that greater governmental regulation of market en-
try cannot be justified. See id. at 567 (“A comparison of the social costs and 
benefits of negative expected value entry found, however, that while overcon-
fident entrants generate negative externalities, they also bring about signifi-
cant social benefits . . . . Upon further analysis it also became apparent that 
the regulation of entry would not only be mostly undesirable, but also costly, 
impractical, and largely ineffective.”). We suspect that if other behavioral law 
and economics scholars undertook similar attempts to quantify the social costs 
and benefits of seemingly irrational behavior they would reach similar conclu-
sions, or at least be less sanguine about the benefits of intervention. 
 91. Identifying optimal behavior is particularly difficult with respect to 
intertemporal choices, for it is not clear how one should optimize between pre-
sent and future aims. See Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time 
Preference: A Critical Review, in TIME AND DECISION 13, 19 (George Loewen-
stein et al. eds., 2003) (noting that, although the discounted utility (DU) model 
has become the normative model of intertemporal choice within economics, 
“Samuelson did not endorse the DU model as a normative model of intertem-
poral choice”); id. at 30 (“[T]he patterns of preferences that are regarded as 
‘anomalies’ in the context of the DU model do not necessarily violate any stan-
dard or principle that people believe they should uphold. Even when the choice 
pattern is pointed out to people, they do not regard themselves as having 
made a mistake (and probably have not made one!).”); see also Jay Bhatta-
charya & Darius Lakdawalla, Time-Inconsistency and Welfare 1–2 (Nat’l Bu-
reau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10345, 2004), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10345. 
Also, it can be very difficult to predict exactly how a bias will evidence it-
self in complex situations. Yet the efficiency potential of various interventions 
may depend quite heavily on knowing the functional form of the underlying 
bias to be remedied. As demonstrated in Eric Posner’s discussion of optimism 
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the difficulties of quantifying aggregate social costs of irrational 
behavior, a fallback position would be to estimate the strength 
or prevalence of the biased behavior itself. Yet in most cases 
the proposals do not even contain information about the base 
rate frequency of the biased behavior within the target popula-
tion, much less an estimate of the economic losses to individu-
als of the biased behavior.92 
Despite the dearth of empirical data relevant to many of 
these factors, we may nevertheless offer some guidance on the 
issues raised by these factors. First, many anomalies exhibit 
considerable elasticity in response to education, material incen-
tives, and self-initiated effortful thought.93 The greater the 
elasticity, the less compelling the argument for hard paternal-
ism absent data on the welfare costs of an anomaly. The com-
mon use of experimental studies that focus on demonstrating 
anomalies rather than testing the limits of the anomalies often 
masks both individual and situational differences in biased be-
havior.94 
 
bias, for instance, plausible assumptions about the risk-limiting behavior of an 
irrational optimist may completely reverse the optimal policy recommenda-
tion. See Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Some Norma-
tive Implications for Tort and Contract Law, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 125, 127–
28 (2004). 
 92. This failure to consider base rates of cognitive bias is a function of the 
conflation of statistically significant experimental findings with findings of 
practical significance outside the laboratory. That is, if a study finds that a 
statistically significant percentage of the participants exhibited irrational be-
havior, then the finding is couched as evidence of some irrational tendency. 
Yet in many cases only a minority of participants needs to exhibit the biased 
behavior to achieve statistical significance (i.e., for the researcher to conclude 
that the bias is not simply random error). For a more detailed discussion of the 
importance of distinguishing between statistical and practical significance, see 
Mitchell, supra note 58, at 1954–60. Failure to consider base rates may con-
tribute to what Sunstein calls “probability neglect” driving policy: “the demand 
for legal intervention can be greatly affected by probability neglect, so that 
government may end up engaging in extensive regulation precisely because 
intense emotional reactions are making people relatively insensitive to the 
(low) probability that the relevant dangers will ever come to fruition.” Cass R. 
Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 
61, 68 (2002). 
 93. For a detailed discussion of the considerable individual differences 
and situational variation in rational and irrational behavior, see Mitchell, su-
pra note 80, at 83–119, 139–67. 
 94. See, e.g., Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, 
The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-analysis, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 147, 149 (1991) (“Many studies in the judgment litera-
ture merely indicate whether a bias exists according to a particular statistical 
level of probability. This knowledge, however, is not adequate information for 
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Second, some very simple—and presumably cheap-to-
implement—educational and procedural interventions prove 
quite effective at debiasing. For instance, short courses in sta-
tistical reasoning that could easily be incorporated into an edu-
cational curriculum show great promise.95 
Third, we should expect greater error in the paternalist’s 
specification of a restricted choice set (the fifth factor) in mar-
kets with traditionally large numbers of options or many het-
erogeneous goods. This is particularly true for highly competi-
tive markets, where such heterogeneity of goods can be seen as 
reflective of true heterogeneous demand. The need for govern-
mental intervention should be less in such markets assuming 
that it is difficult for firms to distinguish between rational and 
irrational consumers, because bias-exploiting contractual terms 
should be less likely to persist in such markets.96 Thus, a per-
sistent supply of heterogeneous goods in a market populated by 
many firms may serve as a rough indicator that rational con-
sumer behavior predominates in this market. 
 
a practitioner deciding whether to be concerned about a bias.”); Chris Swoyer, 
Judgment and Decision-Making: Extrapolations and Applications, in JUDG-
MENTS, DECISIONS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 9, 11 (Rajeev Gowda & Jeffrey C. Fox 
eds., 2002) (“Although little work has been done on individual differences in 
judgment and choice, these differences are often substantial, and researchers 
are beginning to ask: Who reasons in which ways?”). 
 95. See SEDLMEIER, supra note 80, at 140–41 (summarizing the results of 
a series of studies on training in statistical reasoning which found large im-
mediate training effects, high transfer to tasks not used in the training, and 
generally high long-term gains from the training); Peter Sedlmeier & Gerd 
Gigerenzer, Teaching Bayesian Reasoning in Less Than Two Hours, 130 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 380, 396–97 (2001) (presenting results from 
training studies indicating that Bayesian reasoning may be improved dra-
matically through various types of short training programs). Sedlmeier and 
Gigerenzer focused primarily on the training of college students. For an exam-
ple of successful training in probabilistic thinking among third-graders, see 
Graham A. Jones et al., Students’ Probabilistic Thinking in Instruction, 30 J. 
RES. IN MATHEMATICS EDUC. 487 (1999). For an example of successful train-
ing of novice probation officers in the use of statistical principles to predict be-
havior, see Geoffrey T. Fong et al., Improving Probation Decisions Through 
Statistical Training, 17 CRIM. J. & BEHAV. 370 (1990). 
 96. See Alan Schwartz, How Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit? 
29–30 (Am. L. & Econ. Ass’n Ann. Meetings, Working Paper No. 29, 2004), 
available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1158&context= 
alea (“If some consumers are sophisticated while others are naive, but firms 
cannot tell into which class a consumer falls, and if all consumer types will 
shop for low prices and preferred contracts, then competition among firms for 
the marginal consumer will lower the price of every contract type. Further, if 
there are enough sophisticated consumers, and if the other consumers are not 
very naive . . . only good contracts will exist in equilibrium.”). 
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Fourth, allowing individuals to exploit the cognitive biases 
of their trading partners creates incentives for rent seeking on 
the part of the unbiased individual. That is, investments to ex-
ploit cognitive biases may increase the profits of the exploiter 
but decrease total welfare.97 To the extent that courts undo 
such transactions, the insurance simply takes the form of a 
wealth transfer from the exploiter to the exploited. However, 
this wealth transfer improves efficiency because it discourages 
exploiter investments ex ante. But note that if the elasticities 
referenced in the first two factors are nonzero, investments in 
exploitation will actually have a debiasing effect on biased in-
dividuals. Thus, it is necessary to net out these benefits when 
considering the costs of this rent-seeking behavior. In effect, 
education and exploitation are substitute avenues for temper-
ing cognitive biases. Each carries a cost in that education will 
consume resources and exploitation will generate transaction 
elements that lower total welfare. In areas where cognitive bias 
elasticities are high, the optimal solution will be to limit pater-
nalistic interventions and to provide some educational subsidy. 
When elasticities are low, optimality will likely demand protec-
tion of the biased. The chosen mix of partial protection and 
education will depend on the relative elasticities and the rela-
tive costs of cognitive effort, education, and the paternalistic in-
tervention.98 
Finally, the administrative costs of paternalism (the sev-
 
 97. This claim is similar but stronger than that made by Korobkin in his 
form contracts paper. There Korobkin states that firms will compete on salient 
attributes of form contracts and ignore nonsalient attributes, yielding a trans-
action that lowers total welfare. See Korobkin, Standard Form Contracts, su-
pra note 3, at 1234 (“Although market forces should ensure that sellers will 
offer efficient salient contract terms, non-salient attributes are subject to inef-
ficiencies driven by the strategic behavior of sellers attempting to increase 
their profits at the expense of unknowing buyers.”). If we add to this calcula-
tion investments in exploitation tools, the welfare loss grows even larger. 
 98. Other, nonefficiency concerns may exist as well. For example, judi-
cially provided insurance will involve wealth transfers from the exploiter to 
the exploited, which implies that the exploited held a property right not to be 
exploited. Such an assignment of property rights is not normatively required. 
In fact, one could argue that switching to a legal regime that accommodates 
biases through these kinds of wealth transfers violates the property rights of 
the exploiters. Cf. Frey & Eichenberger, supra note 42, at 228 (“In today’s wel-
fare-oriented societies, both the existing law as well as government in pursuit 
of votes tend to work against the economic elimination of actors falling prey to 
anomalies. Actors, whether individuals or firms, who behave ‘irrationally’ are 
prevented from bankruptcy or even major losses, while ‘rational’ actors evad-
ing anomalies are ‘punished’ by being taxed.”). 
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enth factor) should take into account the transaction costs of 
judicial policing of transactions as well as the dampening effect 
on trade that will occur as individuals effectively lose some 
freedom to contract. That is, to the extent that courts police 
transactions, uncertainty about the enforceability of a contract 
increases, which should lead to less contracting or higher prices 
to offset enforcement cost increases. 
In this discussion of optimal institutional design, we ex-
hibit a bias for quantification of the social costs and benefits of 
paternalistic versus laissez-faire responses to irrational behav-
ior, despite the realization that quantifying these costs and 
benefits will often be very difficult. We feel that such a bias is 
nevertheless appropriate because of the risks of “anecdotal pol-
icy making.” Just as some complain about the use of “just so” 
rational choice stories to explain away anomalous behavior,99 a 
corresponding complaint can be made about the use of anomaly 
stories to drive public policy. As demonstrated by the prolifera-
tion of bounded rationality accounts of legally significant be-
havior, it is quite easy to generate stories that explain legal 
phenomena in terms of one of the many behavioral anomalies 
that have been identified within psychology and behavioral 
economics.100 Yet these expert opinions are much more prone to 
diagnostic and prediction errors than a reliance on actuarial or 
statistical data,101 and hence seeking to quantify the costs and 
benefits of irrationality regulation may serve a useful disciplin-
ing effect that leads to more rational policy making.102 
 
 99. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Just So Stories: Posnerian Methodology, 22 
CARDOZO L. REV. 351, 352 (2001) (“I explore at length the degeneration of 
Posner’s conception of rationality from the elegant, if simplistic, model drawn 
from neoclassical economics to its current ad hoc state.”). 
 100. See John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 669, 
670 (1996) (“The sheer number of experiments reporting biases is so great that 
a sizable number of books and long survey papers have been written just to 
review the evidence.”); Krueger & Funder, supra note 20, at 317 (“Just as God 
has been said to have an inordinate fondness for beetles, having made so 
many, social psychologists may have an inordinate fondness for errors, having 
found so many.” (citation omitted)). In many cases, however, one bias story can 
be countered with another bias story given the proliferation of experimentally 
found biases. See Ortmann & Ostatnicky, supra note 89, at 352 n.1 (noting 
that in many cases psychologists have identified a bias and a “contradictory 
sibling” bias). 
 101. See generally MICHAEL A. BISHOP & J.D. TROUT, EPISTEMOLOGY AND 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN JUDGMENT (2004) (discussing the benefits of sta-
tistical prediction rules). 
 102. Cf. William Meadow & Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 
DUKE L.J. 629, 631 (2001) (“In many settings, the fallible opinions of isolated 
MITCHELL & KLICK_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:35:32 AM 
1660 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1620 
 
Indeed, one of the key messages of behavioral law and eco-
nomics—that intuitive judgments will often lead one astray—
brings into question the use of plausibility as a guide to action. 
That is, contrary to the position recently advocated by Russell 
Korobkin,103 telling a plausible story about irrational behavior 
to support a paternalistic intervention, without more, counts as 
little justification for the intervention given the malleability of 
plausibility impressions.104 Put in the language of scientific 
testing, telling a story that seems plausible in light of the data 
provides a fairly weak test of a policy proposal, while the quan-
tification of costs and benefits serves as a much more severe 
 
experts should be supplemented or replaced by statistical data. Those opinions 
should be seen as a kind of crude second-best, far inferior to the data that it 
approximates.”). 
 103. See Russell Korobkin, Possibility and Plausibility in Law and Eco-
nomics, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 783 (2005) (“I propose that the choice be-
tween using [a Rational Choice Theory]-based behavioral assumption and a 
[Behavioral Decision Theory]-based behavioral assumption in law and econom-
ics analysis should turn on the relative plausibility of competing accounts in 
light of existing knowledge, which is often incomplete and indeterminate.”). To 
the extent Korobkin can be understood to argue that behavioral decision the-
ory accounts should initially be treated as more plausible than rational choice 
accounts if the former derive from empirical studies and the latter from intui-
tive, a priori assumptions, we are more sympathetic to Korobkin’s argument. 
And we certainly agree with the spirit of Korobkin’s argument that models 
with arguably implausible assumptions should be subjected to empirical test-
ing. See id. 
 104. The relative plausibility standard raises serious problems with respect 
to what Dawes calls “pseudodiagnosticity” if all we have to guide us is a quali-
tative assessment of which hypothesis seems better supported by the evidence, 
evidence which may be selectively gathered by each competing camp: 
The main problem here is that hypotheses are not compared: instead, 
single hypotheses are evaluated in terms of the degree to which evi-
dence is “consistent with” them; in addition, evidence is often sought 
in terms of its consistency with or inconsistency with “favorite hy-
potheses”—rather than in terms of its ability to distinguish between 
hypotheses. 
Robyn M. Dawes, Behavioral Decision Making and Judgment, in 1 THE 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 497, 533 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th 
ed. 1998); see also ROBYN M. DAWES, EVERYDAY IRRATIONALITY: HOW PSEUDO-
SCIENTISTS, LUNATICS, AND THE REST OF US SYSTEMATICALLY FAIL TO THINK 
RATIONALLY 114 (2001). In short, without some special definition, plausibility 
seems to be a trait that a hypothesis either has or does not have, rather than a 
continuum onto which hypotheses can be placed and compared, and in any 
event, it is unclear how one uncontroversially tests for the existence of plausi-
bility or quantifies a hypothesis’s “degree” of plausibility. See Joseph Agassi, 
Criteria for Plausible Arguments, 83 MIND 406, 410–11 (1974) (discussing 
problems with a relative plausibility standard for judging the scientific ac-
ceptability of theses). 
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test of a proposal.105 Given the restrictions on liberty associated 
with paternalism and the attendant cognitive and moral haz-
ards identified here, we believe that the paternalist should bear 
the burden of demonstrating that the benefits of a paternalistic 
intervention will likely outweigh the costs. 
This is not to say that irrational behavior does not cause 
significant inefficiencies in some domains, nor that legal regu-
lation will never be needed to ameliorate the situation. Indeed, 
our framework leads us to believe that there may be a signifi-
cant role for the government to play with respect to compelling 
informational disclosures in certain forms that make the in-
formation more user-friendly,106 encouraging competition, sub-
sidizing or compelling some forms of education, and even re-
stricting choices when doing so leads to net efficiency gains. 
But a failure to take into account the direct and indirect costs 
of paternalism may lead to perverse results, and, as a behav-
ioral law and economics approach would caution, once a new 
regulation is in place it may be difficult to dislodge due to a 
status quo bias.107 
CONCLUSION 
One of the key insights of behavioral law and economics is 
that context influences behavior in many unanticipated ways. 
We have taken seriously this contextualist insight to consider 
how government regulation intended to counter irrational ten-
dencies may actually exacerbate the problem (i.e., we have ex-
amined irrational behavior as if it were endogenous to the regu-
latory context). Rather than advance any firm conclusions 
about the hazards of paternalism, however, our primary goal 
has been to raise a set of concerns that have received little at-
tention within the behavioral law and economics literature that 
 
 105. See, e.g., DEBORAH G. MAYO, ERROR AND THE GROWTH OF EXPERI-
MENTAL KNOWLEDGE 187 (1996) (“If hypotheses that fit the data equally well 
were equally well supported . . . by the data, then this objection would have 
considerable weight. But the very raison d’être of the severity demand is to 
show that this is not so.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Need to Know: Analytical and Psychologi-
cal Criteria, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 55 (2000) (illustrating how to com-
bine analyses of informational settings with psychological research to formu-
late effective informational disclosures). 
 107. See Jeffrey Stempel, Not-So-Peaceful Coexistence: Inherent Tensions in 
Addressing Tort Reform, 4 NEV. L.J. 337, 351 (2003/2004) (“Applied to public 
policy, legislation, and elections, the status quo bias probably operates to in-
crease the burden on those seeking a change in laws or government.”). 
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has become dominated by discussions of paternalistic solutions 
to irrational tendencies. Of course, only further empirical re-
search can determine whether our concerns are valid and, if so, 
which paternalistic policies in which domains pose the greatest 
moral and cognitive hazards. 
An important benefit of this analytical exercise was an ex-
position of factors that should inform institutional design deci-
sions aimed at addressing anomalous or irrational behavior. 
Simply enumerating these factors illustrated the complexity of 
paternalism, and, as David Shapiro argued several years ago, 
the many interests implicated by paternalistic interventions 
raise serious questions about the wisdom of courts engaging in 
ex post paternalism.108 Yet courts seem increasingly willing to 
endorse the descriptions and prescriptions of behavioral law 
and economics.109 If we are right that cognitive and moral haz-
ards accompany at least some instances of ex post paternalism, 
then the courts would be well-advised to proceed much more 
cautiously and perhaps even to leave decisions about paternal-
istic intervention to legislatures, which should be better able to 
 
 108. Shapiro argues for the primacy of legislatures in matters of paternal-
ism. David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 
519, 521 (1988). 
 109. See O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 
F.3d 973, 1016 (10th Cir. 2004) (McConnell, J., concurring) (“Notwithstanding 
the tendency of those trained in economics to view opportunity costs as equiva-
lent to actual expenditures, modern social science research has confirmed the 
reality of ‘loss aversion’ . . . and the closely related ‘endowment effect.’”); 
United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 335 (5th Cir. 2002) (“As behavioral 
law and economics warns us, inadequate information, biases, and heuristics 
often prevent individuals from acting rationally.”); Abrahamson v. Bd. of 
Educ., 2002 WL 1354711, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2002) (“This phenomenon, 
called loss aversion or the endowment effect, might sway a teacher to retire at 
the end of the Option period, even though he might not have chosen early re-
tirement at the beginning of the three years.”); Catherine M. Sharkey, Puni-
tive Damages: Should Juries Decide?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 381, 382 n.5 (2003) (col-
lecting cases citing the studies reported in CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002)); Neil Vidmar, Experimental Simula-
tions and Tort Reform: Avoidance, Error, and Overreaching in Sunstein et al.’s 
Punitive Damages, 53 EMORY L.J. 1359, 1361 (2004) (noting that Judge 
Weinstein recently cited behavioral research on punitive damage decision 
making as social authority); see also supra notes 47, 59. Of course, courts may 
simply cite behavioral studies to support conclusions driven by other consid-
erations, but in some cases the arguments of the behavioral law and economics 
scholars may possess some motivational force. Moreover, we do not mean to 
suggest that all of these invocations of behavioral economics raise the same 
moral and cognitive hazard concerns, but they do suggest a growing willing-
ness on the part of at least some courts to incorporate behavioral economics 
into their opinions and perhaps even into their decision-making processes. 
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consider competing values and marshal the evidence relevant 
to optimal institutional design. 
